

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Author(s): Diamandouros, Nikiforos P.
Date 1994
Type Working Paper
Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 50 (1994)
City: Madrid
Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales

CULTURAL DUALISM AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN POSTAUTHORITARIAN GREECE

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Estudio/Working Paper 1994/50
February 1994

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The concept of "political culture" is intimately identified with the rise, at the height of decolonization, of interest in the systematic and comparative study of political systems and processes, especially non-Western ones. An important conceptual tool of the developmental approach to the study of politics, pioneered by Gabriel Almond and the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council (New York), it served comparative political analysis well for over two decades.[1]

The concept's interpretative strength lay, among others, in its capacity (a) to eschew the analytical difficulties associated with such influential, earlier tools as "modal personality" or "national character," both of which were marred by the undue attention they ascribed to the role of the unconscious in politics, to the detriment of reason and related factors; (b) to make more imaginative use of theoretical insights derived from anthropology, sociology, and, especially, social psychology; and (c) commensurately to enhance our understanding of important, but little explored, aspects of both western and non-western political systems centering on values, symbols, and beliefs.[2]

Its undeniable utility notwithstanding, "political culture" was, from the very start, subjected to a number of criticisms. Among the more cogent was the charge that, as constructed and used in most of the literature on comparative politics, it tended to reflect excessively the intellectual preoccupations implicit in an approach to the study of culture centering on values and beliefs and on the individual as the basic unit of analysis. Another, more general, criticism held that, as used in the political development literature, culture was often reduced to a residual role in political analysis, being assigned a distinctly subordinate position to social, economic, and other factors as an

explanatory device in the study of politics.

Significant changes, over the past decade and a half, in the way in which culture is conceptualized and studied have greatly expanded its analytical and interpretative potential. In the process, they have made it possible for students of comparative politics to derive new and richer insights capable of addressing some of the earlier criticisms and concerns regarding the ways in which attention to culture and cultural processes can enhance the study of politics.

Chief among these changes has been the increasing ascendancy of an alternative and broader conceptualization of culture, particularly salient in anthropology but, by now, shared by many disciplines, which places primary emphasis on practices, strategies, and tactics pursued by social actors and social groups and giving rise to multiple and ongoing processes of contestation and renegotiation of daily life, which provide and define a broader and richer context for understanding human action, including politics.

This focus on the crucial mediating role of social agents in the construction of social reality has had a commensurate impact on methods of inquiry, shifting attention away from values and beliefs held by individuals to meaning systems, cognitive maps, and shared assumptions articulated by social actors, groups, or collectivities and used as effective mechanisms through which to understand but also to influence external reality.

Such a broader and actor-oriented conceptualization of culture has had multiple and benign effects on the study of politics: it has allowed analysis to focus on macrohistorical perspectives and larger structures; has directed attention to the micro- and macro-processes of

change responsible for the generation and reconstitution of solidaristic arrangements in society, directly or indirectly affecting politics; and has helped render more intelligible the aggregations of discrete items derived from survey research. In addition, the shift in analytical focus which this reconceptualization of culture implies and the central role it assigns to human agency in the generation of change address more directly some of the problems associated with the continuing search for linkages capable of effectively connecting the micro- and macro-levels in political science inquiry.[3]

It is within such a framework of analysis that I should like to approach the interrelation between culture and politics in postauthoritarian Greece, where, with rare exceptions, this subject, whether in its more traditional (political culture) or more recent (politics and culture) conceptualizations, remains severely underresearched. Doing so, however, requires a further elaboration of some of the points just raised and the introduction of certain additional concepts necessary for analysis.[4]

An important byproduct of the emphasis on the importance of human agency for a more thorough and nuanced understanding of culture is a heightened appreciation of the uncertainty, with respect to outcomes, associated with the diverse and often contradictory mechanisms and discourses through which social reality is constructed and renegotiated over time. Thus, in certain cases, such mechanisms and discourses may contribute to, enhance, and reproduce a broader process of integration capable of permeating an increasingly larger number of social subsystems and of imparting in them (and to the institutions and behavioral

patterns they affect) a more integrative logic and developmental dynamic. Alternatively, a different configuration of social actors, discourses, and mechanisms can result in an overall process of social reproduction which is distinguished by its segmental rather than integrative logic and contributes to the emergence of highly divided societies pursuing a different path of (under)development and characterized by distinctly different institutional dynamics and behavioral patterns.

While the reasons underlying the generation of one or other of these types of overall processes are many, the degree of congruence or articulation characterizing the relations of a given state and its society is certainly a major one among them. The more positively articulated a given society is (and historically has been) with its state institutions, the greater the likelihood that it will generate integrative cultural processes that will have a commensurately positive impact on social relations and on politics. Conversely, the lower the degree of positive articulation between the two, the lower the integrative impact of cultural processes on society and politics.

The question of congruence in state-society relations raises, in turn, the issue of the degree of development or underdevelopment attained by particular societies, as they negotiate their transition from traditional and precapitalist to modern and capitalist settings. Seen in this context, the particular developmental trajectory followed during this transition, the early advent or, conversely, the lateness of industrialization, and the relative strength or weakness of civil society acquire major importance. As Gerschenkron was among the first to demonstrate, the earlier the

industrialization experience, the stronger the role played by civil society in the cultural, economic, social, and political transformation this brings about. Indeed, in the case of early industrializers, the very strength of civil society at the onset of industrialization as well as its ability to visualize goals and to articulate specific demands translated, among others, in its increased capacity to play a pivotal role in the gradual fashioning of modern state institutions. In turn, a distinguishing feature of these institutions was the significant degree to which they articulated positively with the needs and demands of the dominant social actors in civil society. This higher degree of congruence, finally, facilitated the emergence of new integrative cultural practices and processes which, over time, permeated state and society, contributed to the generation of new and the redefinition of old solidarities, profoundly transformed the systems of shared assumptions affecting behavior, accelerated the process of change, and confirmed the ascendancy and eventual dominance of the new order over the old.[5]

It follows from the preceding discussion that the experience of countries in which industrialization came later rather than earlier is, in this realm as in many others, qualitatively different. The relative weakness of civil society, so salient a characteristic of late industrializers; the incapacity of social actors in it to play a major role in the fashioning of state institutions capable of articulating positively with their own needs and demands; and the resulting, antagonistic and tense relationship between state and society, itself the outcome of the more negative articulation between the two, effectively prevented the

emergence, in these countries, of integrative cultural processes capable of investing the new order with hegemonic legitimacy.

What did emerge, instead, were competing and conflicting cultural traditions, whose number and salience varied, depending on national specificities, but which were distinguished by their segmental character, by their particularism, and by their incapacity to spawn an integrative dynamic and to ensure their permanent ascendancy over their rivals. In the postcolonial states of Africa and Asia, the salience of cleavages rooted in primordial sentiments resulted in the emergence of multiple and conflicting cultures which effectively precluded the rise of a dominant, integrative culture, thereby seriously impeding the process of nation-building and of national integration.[6]

The experience of late industrializers in Southern Europe, the Cone of Latin America, and, to a lesser extent, parts of Eastern Europe is somewhat different. In these countries, (and here I shall confine myself primarily to the Southern European region, that is, to Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), the power and resources of the social and political forces favoring structural change in the economy, polity, and society were sufficiently strong to ensure their permanent entrenchment at the center stage of their respective national politics. At the same time, however, these same forces proved unable to overcome the resistance of potent rival interests associated with the traditional order and to dislodge them from many of their centers of power. The inability of either side to gain permanent ascendancy over the other and the resulting emergence and coexistence, over a long time, of two separate

cultures, each with its own universe of meanings, shared assumptions, and symbolic content produced a profound and enduring division in the society and politics of these countries. While facilitating its reproduction and ensuring its continuing vitality, the capacity of each culture creatively to adapt to changes in its domestic and international environments served to impede rather than to promote integration.

Seen from this perspective, the history of these countries in the 19th and 20th centuries is, in many ways, the story of continuing and, until very recently, more-often-than-not failed attempts by one or the other of the major cultural traditions to translate its temporary ascendancy into an enduring one and permanently to eclipse its rival. In different periods of varying lengths during the last two centuries, one or the other tradition, having gained ascendancy through the temporary rise to power of the social and political forces espousing it, acted as the dominant "logic" of integration, its rival as the "logic" of resistance, or, in Kirchheimer’s terms, as the confining condition which would have to be overcome, if transitory ascendancy were to be translated into enduring dominance and paralyzing confrontation between the old and the new were to give way to resolution. On the other hand, periods in which neither culture and the social and political forces identified with each succeeded in gaining ascendancy were marked by stagnation, increased tension and, not infrequently, instability, civil strife or even outright civil war.[7]

Though internalized by the rival cultures in different ways and in a fashion which tended to reinforce principles

and logics distinctive to each one, these repeated failures in integration imparted in both strong elements of underachievement and inadequacy that became expressed through diffuse feelings of shame, humiliation, alienation, and apathy. Over the long-term, progress and change, even when realized, were perennially meager, lacking in fullness or depth--seemingly the results of a process whose central logic was more accretive than assimilative. The agonizingly slow pace and the great cost at which these were achieved weakened the legitimacy of what had been attained and rendered it more tenuous and fragile.

A cursory glance at the intellectual and political climate reigning in the four Southern European countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries amply confirms the sense of malaise, disillusionment, despair, frustration, and underachievement which prevailed in all of them and which was graphically captured in, among many others, Ortega y Gasset's work on Spain and Paparrhegopoulos's late writings on Greece.[8]

It was only in very recent decades that this variant of Gramsci's "organic crisis" seemed, at long last, to approach resolution, as one of the two rival traditions, the one identified with reform, democratization, the market mechanism, and rationalization of structures gradually but steadily gained the upper hand and, with inevitable national variations, achieved variable levels of irreversibility.[9]

The complex nature of the transition to modernity, of the choices it involves, and of the legacies it gives rise to can be better understood, if seen through the lens of the concept of "critical juncture." Derived from the work of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan and, more recently,

elaborated upon by Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, "critical juncture" refers to a disrupting and reorienting encounter of a prevalent order with a novel force, which has a long-term impact on the developmental trajectory of a given society. Clearly implicit in the tradition of historical sociology and of development theories exemplified by, and associated with, Barrington Moore, Jr. and Alexander Gerschenkron, it has, more recently, been creatively made use of in different epistemological settings concerned with the nature and long-term implications of change, including "path-dependent analysis" and "chaos theory."[10]

The utility of the concept is twofold. First, it focuses attention on the discrete phases or moments of the subprocess of change brought about by the occurrence of the critical juncture. As such, it helps underscore the importance of particular sequences in the unfolding of change and to heighten appreciation of successful strategies or, conversely, missed opportunities on the part of the actors involved in the process. Second, it enhances comparative examination and understanding of distinct responses to a common stimulus at a given historical moment. The nature of such a stimulus (or, more conventionally, crisis) varies but it typically involves a shift, a reorientation in the developmental trajectory traveled by a given society, and the creation of a new trajectory, distinct from the old one but obviously interacting with it. The duration of the critical juncture also varies. In their treatment of this topic, Collier and Collier identify and briefly discuss a variety of such occurrences lasting from a brief "moment" to an extended period of almost a quarter century.[11] The outcome of a critical juncture, finally, is a historical legacy distinct

from the one identified with the antecedent conditions disrupted by the advent of the critical juncture. The length of that legacy also varies from case to case and is harder to determine. But, it certainly involves several decades and even longer periods of time.

In the case of Southern Europe, the abrupt and profoundly disruptive encounter with the political and ideological shock waves unleashed upon the rest of the continent by the French Revolution and liberalism, during the early decades of the 19th century, constituted the critical juncture which profoundly affected and reshaped the history of the societies in the region and set them on a novel and distinct developmental path. Its most lasting historical legacy was the cultural dualism which, for about a century and a half, became the distinguishing feature of these countries, pitting defenders of the old order against proponents of the new and effectively serving as the confining condition to the decisive break with the past which would render irreversible the transition to modernity in these societies.

The Greek case fits well into this general pattern. The construction of a modern state in Greece during the first half of the 19th century entailed the introduction in that country of Western, liberal political institutions (e.g., constitutionalism, rule of law, legal-bureaucratic state, regular army) and their grafting onto traditional and precapitalist, indigenous structures that were essentially the product of the long Byzantine (Church, law) and Ottoman (state) heritages. Given the fundamental political and cultural reorientation in state-society relations which this process entailed, it, somewhat inevitably, became marked by

intense social, political, and cultural struggles in which potential beneficiaries and potential losers in the redefinition of power relations within Greece played the central role.

Seen in this light, the highly contested process of Greek state-building can be said to constitute the major critical juncture in modern Greek history, an occurrence which set the country on a new and distinct developmental path and defined the basic parameters of Greece's encounter with modernity. The lasting historical legacy generated by this critical juncture was the emergence of two powerful and sharply conflicting cultural traditions, embedded in the novel (Western) and antecedent (Byzantine-Ottoman) elements of the modern Greek historical experience, which, over time, reproduced themselves through ogoing and overlapping processes of interaction, accretion, assimilation, and adaptation. Though these temporally and spatially different processes often resemble multiple layers of a palimpsest which render earlier accretions or configurations less readily discernible in their details, the major assumptions informing each of the twin Greek cultures have remained quite identifiable over time and have shaped the dynamics of modern Greek society and politics from the 19th century to the present.[12]

Two major, distinctive features of the two cultures deserve comment at this point: the first concerns their cross-sectional nature, the tendency, that is, to cut across Greek institutions, strata, classes, or political parties in Greek society and not to become exclusively identified with any one such structure across time or even at any given moment. Put otherwise, though particular institutions or

social actors, including political parties, have, in specific historical periods, tended to become more explicitly identified with one or the other of the rival cultures and to serve as their primary exponents, the extent of identification has varied from period to period and cannot be taken for granted. Second, precisely because of their cross-cutting nature, both cultures have historically reproduced themselves within the quasi-totality of Greek institutions, structures, and social arrangements. In the process, they have furthered their own entrenchment, have imparted their conflictual logics on social and political interactions, and have commensurately impeded
the emergence of alternative, consensual, and more integrative arrangements capable of acting as effective mechanisms of interest representation or aggregation in the country.

The remainder of this essay consists of two parts: the first undertakes an anatomy of these two cultures in their historical evolution and ideal-typical characteristics; the second makes use of these concepts in an interpretation of the politics of postauthoritarian Greece, with special emphasis on the decade of the 1980s.

The evolution of the two cultures. The older of the two cultures reflects the historical realities of the Greek longue duree. Steeped in the Balkan-Ottoman heritage and profoundly influenced by the Weltanschauung of an Orthodox church which, for historical, intellectual, as well as theological reasons, had long maintained a strongly, and occasionally militant, anti-western stance, this is a culture marked by a pronounced introvertedness; a powerful statist orientation coupled with a profound ambivalence concerning

capitalism and the market mechanism; a decided preference for paternalism and protection, and a lingering adherence to precapitalist practices; a universe of moral sentiments in which parochial and, quite often, primordial attachments and the intolerance of the alien which these imply predominate; a latent authoritarian orientation fostered by the structures of Ottoman rule and by the powerful cultural legacy of what Weber so perceptibly termed a "sultanistic regime"; and a diffident attitude towards innovation.[13]

The significance of Orthodoxy for the development of this cultural tradition needs to be stressed. Situated at the outer perimeter of the territories which historically have constituted the European part of the Western world, Eastern Orthodoxy has been the dominant religion in societies which, over a long historical period spanning a number of centuries, were the first to experience the pressures, threats, disruption, and devastation associated with wars and invasions of hostile ethnic and religious groups emanating from lands to its East or South. Thus, whether in periods of great ascendancy or in moments of weakness, the societies steeped in the cultural traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy have tended to think of themselves as frontier territories and cultures always exposed to potential threats from hostile forces. Accordingly, they have also tended to construct cognitive maps reflecting this perception of their environment. The gradual estrangement of the medieval Orthodox world from its Catholic counterpart and the formal break which occurred in 1054 added an extra dimension of external threat perception (this time from the West) to the culture of Eastern Orthodoxy.

Over time, this sense of intense isolation emerged as a

salient feature of Eastern Orthodoxy's dominant culture and helped shape its view of history and of its role in it. Crucial in the development of this Orthodox Weltanschauung was the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople, historically regarded as the primus inter pares within Eastern Orthodoxy and dominated throughout by the Greek component of the Orthodox world. In turn, the Greek dominance of the Patriarchate effectively meant that many of the elements informing the Patriarchate's view of Orthodoxy and of its role in history gradually found their way into the older of the Greek cultural traditions that concerns us here.

In line with this view, the purpose of Orthodoxy was, in theological terms, defined in strictly conservative terms which assigned highest priority to the preservation and defense of those social and political arrangements that were deemed most closely to reflect the meaning of the original covenant between man and God and actively to oppose efforts to alter it. At a more secular level, this same view, as elaborated by the Patriarchate in Constantinople, has historically expressed itself in four major ways or principles: first, in a powerful siege mentality which expressed itself in fears concerning "the contraction" of the Orthodox world under pressure from hostile forces surrounding it. Second, in a profound antipathy towards cultural and political structures identified with the Catholic Church and, more generally, "the West." The long memories of conflict centering on (a) the Crusades and, especially, on the fourth one, which resulted in the Latin conquest of Constantinople and the dissolution of the Byzantine Empire for more than half a century (1204-1261); and (b) the controversial role of

the Western Church in the events leading to the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks (1453) were some of the more poignant experiences underpinning and preserving this profound diffidence towards the Western Christian world. Third, a willingness to accept the primacy of state authority over the Church, which was regarded as divinely ordained, was rooted in the Christian Byzantine experience, and persisted during the centuries of Ottoman conquest. A concomitant of this attitude was the profound conviction that "[t]he church has no secular mission, because it is not of this world and should not pursue things secular...[which] are preordained by God for another organism, the state." Lastly, an abhorrence of "division" within the body ecclesiastic, which rendered the Church ill-prepared for facing the challenges emanating from the emergence of nation-states on the historical scene. Hence, its strenuous opposition to nationalism in the 19th century which was eventually overcome through recourse to the expedient provided by the principle recognizing the ascendancy of secular authority over the church in noncanonical matters and which, in practical terms, translated in the grudging acquiescence to the creation of national churches in the newly-created national states of the Orthodox world.[14]

The long-term, intimate links which historically developed between the Greek world and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople effectively meant that, over time, many of the Church’s views and attitudes osmotically found their way into the older of the two cultural traditions which, since the early decades of the 19th century has exercised a powerful influence upon Greek politics. To give but two examples: the roots of this culture’s obsessive

concern with the issue of the "contraction of Hellenism" is clearly traceable to the historical understanding of the world as hostile, and of the Patriarchate's view of Eastern Orthodoxy as a contracting Christian civilization perennially under siege. Ingenuously but misguidedly identifying "Greek" with "Eastern Orthodox," exponents of this tradition have tended to regard as traditionally "hellenic" (in the national-secular sense of the term) territories and, to a lesser extent, populations which, in the past, had come under the powerful cultural influence of the Patriarchate and, in so doing, partook of a hellenically-informed high culture based primarily on the use of the Greek language as a lingua franca in the realms of liturgy, commerce, and higher education. The incorporation of these territories and populations in other Balkan national states and, thus, their perceived "loss" to the Greek nation have been regarded as tangible evidence of the "contraction of hellenism," as a reminder of potential dangers still lurking ahead, and, consequently, of the need for vigilance in the face of a menacing environment.

Decisively contributing to the preoccupation over the "contraction of hellenism" in this culture was the gradual destruction of significant and influential Greek minorities in former territories of the Ottoman which, over time, gained their independence and emerged as new national states in the Balkans and the Middle East. The tendency to internalize these developments as "losses" of "Greek lands" "rightfully" belonging to the nation and as the massive violation of national "vested rights" reached its high point in wake of the eradication from Anatolian territories of approximately 1.5 million mostly Greek-speaking, Orthodox subjects of the

former Ottoman empire, following the Greek defeat in the 1919-1922 war against the forces supporting the emergent republic of Turkey. Rather than accepting and understanding these events as inevitable and tragic consequences of a historical process (e.g., nationalism) profoundly transforming the principles governing the political organization of peoples and of state entities, this culture has, instead, tended to privilege the imagery of "lost fatherlands," and "lost homes," for which forces inimical to hellenism are to be held responsible.[15]

A closely related but axial dimension of this culture is a pronounced xenophobia whose roots are partly religious and partly secular. Religious because of this culture's privileged links with Orthodoxy, by whose defensive perception of the world it has been greatly influenced; secular because of the Greek national state's mostly traumatic experiences in the realm of international politics throughout much of its history. More specifically, the historical sources of this xenophobia include (a) the "conditional sovereignty" which, for a century following liberation from Ottoman rule, characterized the country's formal status in international relations, sharply restricting its freedom of movement and resulting in a plethora of embarrassing and humiliating experiences; (b) the thwarted nationalist ambitions associated with the highly contested, long, and tortuous historical process which gave birth to the successor states of the Ottoman empire in the Balkans; and (c) the troubled and divisive role played in domestic Greek politics either by foreign powers or by indigenous structures directly or indirectly identified with them.

Stripped to its essentials, the xenophobic element so

pronounced in the older of the rival Greek cultures can be said to involve (a) a distinct preference for conspiratorial interpretations of events, rooted in a siege mentality and in a distinctly defensive perception of the international environment inherited from the religious and secular influences just discussed; (b) a pervasive and exaggerated yet fragile and insecure sense of nationalism which has consistently overshadowed the democratic element within the culture; (c) a manichean division of the world into "philhellenes" and "mishellenes"; (d) a pronounced sense of cultural inferiority towards the western world coupled with a hyperbolic and misguided sense of the importance of Greece in international affairs and, more generally, in the history of western civilization; and, finally, (e) a clear inclination to identify with other collectivities or individuals (e.g., Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, the fallen hero of the Portuguese revolution of 1974) perceived to have suffered from western inequity.[16]

Reflecting the historical absence of large property-ownership in the country, the lack of pronounced class distances in Greek society, and the highly contested character of the state-building process, this culture is also distinguished by a potent, indeed leveling, egalitarianism and by the predominant role which it assigns to the state in its relations with society. Directly issuing from these features is a distinctive conception of democracy and of citizenship which, over time, has played an ambivalent and problematic role in the social and political conflicts affecting the democratization process in Greece.

The leveling egalitarianism of this culture and the predominant role it assigns to the state are intimately

related. The former is rooted in historical experiences deriving from both the Ottoman and postindependence periods of Greek history. Both the legal fiction and the political realities of Ottoman rule tended to impart a leveling quality to the social organization of the empire's subject peoples. The unrestrained, personal, and absolute, "sultanistic" rule which constituted the essence of the Ottoman regimes imparted a leveling quality to the lives of non-Muslim subjects of the empire, which tended to invalidate carefully constructed social distances based on status and ultimately to reduce to a similar condition of uncertainty and insecurity the humble and the exalted among these subjects.

The leveling qualities of Ottoman political reality were exacerbated in the later (18th and 19th) centuries of Ottoman rule, as the gradual disintegration of the imperial institutions progressed and as arbitrariness and corruption commensurately increased. These phenomena were especially acute in the imperial periphery, where the bulk of the empire's Greek-speaking Orthodox subjects were concentrated. The well-documented cases of the precipitous rise and demise of Greeks holding official posts in the local, regional, or imperial administration constitute tangible evidence of a more general trend that was widely observable throughout the Empire in the later centuries of its existence and which inevitably exacerbated the leveling qualities of this culture of unpredictability and insecurity in which the collective memories of the subject populations were embedded. It was, in turn, these hobbesian conditions marked by the breakdown of order, lawlessness, and pervasive insecurity which shaped the conception of the state as the source of all power, the dispenser of rights, and the instrument of the weak against

the strong that became dominant in the older of the two Greek cultural traditions.

A direct byproduct of this view of the state was the rise of a positivist legal tradition in independent Greece, one of whose major tenets is that human and civil rights derive from the state itself and do not to inhere directly in individuals. The restrictive conception of citizenship and of the rights of the individual which emerges from such an inflated understanding of the role of the state has commensurately affected this culture's conception of democracy and, more generally, of politics. Implicit in the logic of the quasi-omnipotent state is a conception of democracy which (a) places a premium on the direct and unmediated exercise of power and accords limited value to the role of institutions as structures mediating and shaping relations between rulers and ruled; (b) is deeply ambivalent and diffident towards the idea of an active civil society assertive of its rights and seeking to expand them; (c) exhibits a distinct preference for small and familiar structures compatible with, and promotive of, clientelistic practices; (d) has a formal rather than substantive understanding of the rules of the democratic game; and (e) holds a commensurately instrumental view of politics.[17]

In short, this can be described as a powerful underdog culture which, whether at the mass or the elite levels, became, over time, particularly entrenched among the very extensive, traditional, more introverted, and least competitive strata and sectors of Greek society and was more fully elaborated by intellectuals adhering to this tradition. The distinguishing characteristic of these strata was their involvement in activities (subsistence agriculture, petty

commodity production not geared to exports, finance, import-substitution industries, and the overinflated and unproductive state- and wider-public sector) marked, above all, by low productivity, low competitiveness, the absence or tenuousness of economic, political, and cultural linkages to the outer world and to the international economy, the aversion to reform, and powerful, affective commitments to various adaptations of domestic structures inherited from the long Ottoman tradition.

Reflecting this complex set of characteristics and system of meanings, this culture's projet de societe, that is, its vision of Greece at the national, regional, and international systems as well as its understanding of change and modernization is profoundly defensive, protectionist, and, in many ways, rudimentary. By far its most distinctive feature is the central, indeed preponderant, role it assigns to the state vis-a-vis civil society. Seen simultaneously as the "natural" ally and protector of the weak and noncompetitive strata and structures from the ever-threatening and increasing pressures of the market mechanism and of the international system, the state has historically been regarded as the motor force for the defensive modernization of Greek society along lines that will minimize the disruption which change is likely to cause to these structures and strata. This is a view of modernization common among late developing societies, which reflects this culture's ambivalence towards the liberal, Western model of socioeconomic change and which historically manifests itself in the willingness to search for, and experiment with, "alternative" routes to modernity.[18]

The sheer size of these strata, the lingering influence

derived from their traditional dominance within Greek society, and an enormous capacity for adaptability which ensured their survival and even their proliferation rendered less discernible, for a long time, the mortal threat to their continuing vitality posed, over the long run, by the gradual modernization and development of the Greek economy, society, and polity. Reflecting both this long-term pressure and the incapacity of these strata, because of the lateness and weakness of industrialization in Greece, to forge strategies of collective action capable of generating viable alternatives to marginalization, the pivotal principle of this culture has been a pervasive, lasting, ever-adaptable but diffuse sense of defensiveness, inequity, victimization, and persecution, coupled by enormous staying power, tenacity, and an obsessive preoccupation with short- term perspectives to the detriment of long-term considerations. These characteristics permeate the mechanisms through which this culture perceives, interprets and internalizes events and developments, and constructs its imagery and system of shared assumptions. This, finally, is a culture which, despite fluctuations, can be said to claim the allegiance of a majority of the Greek population since independence.[19]

The younger of the twin cultures in modern Greece draws its intellectual origins from the Enlightenment and from the tradition of political liberalism issuing from it. Secular and extrovert in orientation, it has tended to look to the nations of the advanced industrial West for inspiration and for support in implementing its programs. Over time, it has been identified with a distinct preference for reform, whether in society, economy, or polity, designed to promote rationalization along liberal, democratic, and capitalist

lines.[20] Favorable to the market mechanism and supportive of the strategic use of the state to foster social and political arrangements promotive of competition and of an internationally-competitive economy, it has been more receptive to innovation and less apprehensive of the costs involved in the break with tradition. More outward-looking and less parochial than its rival, this is a culture which, on the whole, has tended to favor rather than to oppose the creation and proliferation of international linkages for Greece and to promote its integration into the international system.

At the political level, the lasting links with liberalism have closely identified this cultural tradition with a quest for constitutionalism and, more generally, with a commitment to democracy, whether of the earlier, liberal or more recent, political variety, as a major long-term goal worth pursuing despite occasional reversals. Implicit in this conceptualization of democracy are: (a) a distinct and normative preference for the mediated exercise of power, through the establishment and gradual consolidation of modern political institutions suited to that purpose; and (b) an expansive rather than restrictive conceptualization of civil and human rights and, more generally, a central and, over time, mounting concern with the nature and content of citizenship in the Greek the political system. A major byproduct of this emphasis on the critical significance of institutions and of the rights of citizens for the success of the long march to democracy is the desire to diminish the pervasive influence of clientelistic relations in politics and the dependence on particularistic arrangements and corporatist structures which it implies. In this regard, as

well, this culture has deeply influenced by evolving trends in the more "developed" democracies of the advanced industrial West.

The major social and political actors who became the primary carriers of this culture, sharing and shaping its assumptions, adopting and adapting its imagery, have been (a) within Greece, the popular strata and elites more closely identified with cultural, economic (agricultural, commercial, or, over time, industrial), and political activities linking them to the international system; (b) the Greek diaspora communities in the Ottoman empire, Southern Russia, and Western Europe, a very large percentage of which was engaged in commercial and, to a lesser extent, banking activities that both linked it to, and made it particularly sensitive about, developments in the international political, cultural, and economic environment; and (c) their intellectual exponents, both inside and outside the Greek state.

The particular composition of these actors and their position in the international division of labor determined, in large part, the specific ways in which this culture internalized and negotiated domestic as well as international developments affecting Greek politics and society. Put otherwise, the strong international exposure and orientation of these factors played a critical role in shaping the content of the shared assumptions and the system of meanings informing the culture’s understanding of its environment.

More specifically, I would argue that a crucial component of the overall process affecting the development of this culture derives from the historical experience of the diaspora communities, and, especially, their bourgeois segment, as powerful but also interstitial actors in the

countries where they were settled. The rise of nationalism in both the more homogeneous states of Western Europe and the multiethnic entities of East-Central and Southeastern Europe during the 19th century and exposure to the intrusive and transformative dynamic of western capital in the territories inhabited by these communities presented them with a sharp dilemma: on the one hand, it heightened their own appreciation of the opportunities implicit in a national enterprise and led many of them to envisage, promote, and contribute to reform efforts in Greece, whether from afar or, beginning in the latter part of the 19th century, from within the boundaries of the Greek state. On the other, the same process, which, over time, greatly undermined the erstwhile ascendancy and, in certain areas, dominance of these communities within Ottoman territories, served to underscore the fragile foundations and ultimately untenable nature of their position in the context of radically changed political and ideological circumstances. In the process, it also emphasized their interstitiality and added to their sense of vulnerability.

It was these collective experiences which imparted to the cultural tradition identified with these social forces a keen appreciation of both the opportunities and dangers arising from the volatility of the domestic and international environments facing Greece. This increased sensitivity translated, in turn, into a system of shared assumptions which (a) placed a premium on quick adaptation to changing circumstances; (b) fostered an imitative temperament eclectically open to ideas and currents emanating from Western European and meant to distinguish these communities from their indigenous social and cultural milieux and to

underscore their links with their western prototypes; (c) spawned a cultural cosmopolitanism linked to an often exalted sense of Greece's international importance; (d) gave rise to a xenophobic streak embedded more on the secular rather the religious dimension of "the contraction of hellenism" and, hence, milder, more sophisticated, and less strident than that of its underdog counterpart; (e) engendered a manipulative approach to international relations which coexisted uncomfortably with a more realistic and occasionally creative sense of the opportunities but also the limitations facing a small country such as Greece, as it attempted to promote its international policies in a traditionally sensitive and turbulent area of the world; and (f) brought forth a dynamic nationalism rooted in the will for survival, which their experience as minorities had produced, and tempered by the greater weight this tradition accorded to the pursuit of reform and of democratization.[21]

In short, this is a reformist culture whose projet de societe, shaped, in great part, by the experiences and perceptions of the Greek diaspora bourgeoisie and its domestic allies, draws heavily from the liberal, western model of transition to modernity through the market mechanism and democratic politics, favors moderate and incremental change, and assigns a privileged role to society in its relations with the state. Armed with its cosmopolitan Weltanschauung, the reformist culture was the ascendant element in the Greek world from roughly the last quarter of the 19th century until the mid-1930s. From then on and until the end of the colonels' authoritarian regime in 1974, it entered a period of slow but pronounced decline paralleling the gradual destruction of the diaspora communities and the

exhaustion of the Venizelist project, both of which had long sustained it. During this long period, the underdog culture experienced a growing ascendancy in Greek politics.[22]

The structural changes in both domestic and international Greek politics associated with the establishment of the Third Greek Republic, in 1974, and the subsequent Greek entry into the European Community unleashed a dynamic which imparted a new vitality to the reformist tradition and helped it embark upon a period of considerable resurgence which has enabled it gradually to challenge its rival in a bid for ascendancy during the current phase in the evolution of Greek political life. For reasons that I hope to demonstrate below, the confrontation between the rival cultures which this challenge has brought about has resulted in yet another period of transition, whose distinguishing features are a pronounced indeterminacy and uncertainty that have left their imprint on the developments of the last two decades. It is to these that we shall now turn.

The postauthoritarian period. Narrowing the scope of inquiry to a shorter period of time serves an important methodological function: it allows analysis to focus at the microlevel and renders possible a better understanding of the process by which each of the competing cultures internalizes particular events, integrates them into its own axial logic(s), invests them with specific meaning and symbolic content, and enables them to act as mechanisms of reproduction and diffusion. It follows that the same events or sets of developments are internalized in different ways by each culture, acquiring meanings and content congruent with, and reinforcing, the axial logic(s) of each. But the specific long-term weight a particular event or set of events

will have in shaping the overall system of shared assumptions and meanings informing the culture is difficult to discern before some time has elapsed. In the interim, the best that the analyst can do is to focus on emerging trends made discernible by concatenations of events and rendering possible multiple readings of the period he/she is concerned with.

The dilemmas posed by this change in focus from longer to shorter periods become magnified, if the temporal frame of inquiry is a moment of transition which involves, almost by definition, shift(s) in the relations between competing coalitions of forces, period(s) of phasing out- and phasing-out, and inevitable flux that obscures the thrust of events and renders their inner logic more difficult to discern. This, I believe, is the case with the last twenty years, a period which, as I hope to demonstrate, has been marked by the gradual phasing-in of the reformist culture and the intense resistance of the underdog culture at the prospect of its renewed marginalization.

Nineteen seventy-four unquestionably marks a watershed in the development of both cultures. The establishment, in that year, of full political democracy for the first time in Greek history changed the structures of Greek political life in profound and lasting ways. Obscured by the unquestionable continuities embedded in the restorative rather than the instaurative element of the transition, the advent of political democracy set off novel as well as powerful, long-term processes of social and political change which have profoundly affected the evolution of the two cultures. The most salient of these ongoing and as-yet incomplete processes are: (a) the emancipation of the conduct of foreign policy

from foreign tutelage; (b) the democratization of domestic politics with spill-overs into society and culture; and (c) the internationalization and, more specifically, Europeanization of Greek politics and culture--a development intimately connected with Greece's accession to the European Community but having profound, longer-term implications for the structure of Greek society and economy.[23]

These three processes define a frame of reference which allows us to speak of the postauthoritarian years in Greece as a period in which the dominant imagery and discourse have, in the broad sense of the term, been democratic. More specifically, while earlier periods in Greek history were marked by struggles concerning the quest for democracy, the dominant discourse during the current phase reflects conflicts and disagreements concerning the type of democracy which should prevail in Greece. And in this context, the shared assumptions and systems of meaning informing the two rival cultures have been significantly different. The differential and often contradictory ways in which these processes have influenced each culture's evolutionary trajectory--simultaneously reinvigorating and undermining each of them--and the multiple readings that they give rise to require more systematic analysis and evaluation. To these I shall now turn, following a brief note concerning the periodization to be used here and the rationale informing it.

For purposes of this analysis, the postauthoritarian years can be divided into two subperiods: the first, extends from 1974 to 1985. The second begins in the latter year and continues to this date. The major criterion underpinning such a periodization is the capacity of the Greek polity and

economy successfully to incorporate and to integrate into their respective systems the extensive and upwardly mobile social strata effectively marginalized within the postwar, anticommunist system and excluded from autonomous participation in it.

The first subperiod, which I shall call "the incorporative moment," was distinguished by (a) the incorporation of these strata into the political democracy established in Greece after 1974; (b) their autonomous participation in the political system through the institutional mechanisms provided for that purpose primarily by PASOK and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE); and (c) their clear ideological (1974-81) and political ascendancy (1981-85) in Greek society and politics. The post-1985 period, which I shall call the "moment of entrenchment" (and for which the austerity program inaugurated in October of that year serves as the symbolic terminus ad quem), is to be understood as a period in which the incorporative momentum reached its limits, as the social forces which had served as its main carriers entered a phase of entrenchment, henceforth acting more as confining conditions inhibiting the restructuring and transformation necessary for their substantive integration into the Greek economy and society than as a vehicle for further change.[24]

The emancipation of Greek foreign policy. The Cyprus debacle and its aftereffects constitute the international dimension of the three central developments defining the multiple significance of 1974 in contemporary Greek history and politics. At its most visible level, the crisis unleashed by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the Greek inability effectively to either prevent it or reverse it

brought about a number of structural changes in Greece's international relations. The most significant of these were: (a) the move of Greek foreign policy away from an exclusive and often slavish dependence on the United States and NATO; (b) the adoption of a more European stance underscored by the strengthening of relations with Western European states and, above all, by the application and eventual admission to the European Community; (c) the development of closer ties with a number of states, especially those in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union; and (d) more generally, the emergence of a more independent Greek presence in the international system.

The reorientation of Greek foreign policy away from American tutelage and the resulting shift in status from that of a satellite to that of an ally affected the twin Greek cultures in significant, though different and quite antithetical, ways. In the discourse of the reformist culture, the language and imagery of enhanced sovereignty resonated with the sense of pride and achievement implicit in the newfound capacity to reduce the intensity of the country's links with the United States and to privilege, instead, the European option through participation in the European Community and related European institutions. The ability to subordinate purely military and strategic considerations to political and economic ones was also seen as enhancing the logic of modernization, rationalization, and reform and of commensurately benefiting the reformist culture.

On the other hand, it was the more negative experiences and images associated with the Cyprus crisis and its aftermath which, on the whole, left their mark on the

underdog culture. The wave of anti-americanism unleashed by the perceived partiality of the United States in favor of Turkey during the Cyprus crisis of July 1974 as well as by the strong conviction, held by large sectors in Greek society, concerning American complicity in the April 1967 coup d'etat helped to exacerbate the xenophobic element in the underdog culture and to question the extent of enhanced sovereignty that the 1974 transition to democracy had actually brought about. The powerful but latent anti-westernism and the leveling and reductionist logic which run deep through this culture came forcefully to the fore in the form of arguments suggesting that the shift from the Atlantic to the European option represented a mere change of hegemon for Greece and hardly enhanced national independence or sovereignty. The same visceral anti-westernism combined with the simultaneous rejection of "extant socialism" as a viable alternative model for Greece to follow led to the adoption, by PASOK and the fast-growing strata adhering to it, of pronounced tiers mondistes orientations which greatly strengthened latent but powerful identifications with other peoples and nations perceived to share with Greece a common heritage of exploitation by western capitalism.

Most analysts of Greek foreign policy correctly observe that these extreme attitudes became significantly tempered with the passage of time. During PASOK's first term in office, to be sure, the structural imperatives of Greek foreign relations made it necessary sharply to curtail the use of language and imagery derived from the shared assumptions of the underdog culture in the design and execution of foreign policy. Such use as there was was either confined to the level of rhetoric--especially in areas

crucial to Greece’s foreign interests (United States, European Community, NATO, Turkey)--or channeled into initiatives which did not unduly damage the country’s vital foreign concerns. This notwithstanding, the retention of this rhetoric underscores the continuing power of the xenophobic element, so deeply-rooted in the underdog culture, and points to its undiminished potential for exploitation in the domestic politics of this period.

The gradual distancing from the more extreme positions held during the years of opposition became even more pronounced in the post-1985 period, when the logic of the "moment of entrenchment" dictated policies that were increasingly more in line with those of Greece’s major allies and partners in the European Community or NATO. The adoption of ever more pragmatic policy stands in the area of foreign affairs became amply confirmed in the party’s "new proclamation of principles," issued on the 19th anniversary of the original statement of 3rd September 1974, which has formally served as the ideological reference point for the party. The thrust of the language used in this new document in connection with foreign policy issues pointedly underscores the fact that, at the declaratory level at least, PASOK has profited from its years in power and has adopted policy stands which differ little from those associated with social democratic parties in Western Europe. Time will show, if, in the event the party comes to power in the next elections which constitutionally have to be held by Spring 1994, this moderation will prove to be a permanent feature of the party’s stand on foreign policy or merely another preelectoral ploy designed to gain votes and to bring the party to power.[25]

The democratization of domestic politics. As already noted, the advent of political democracy and the resulting incorporation into the political system of social forces which, since the end of the civil war had remained effectively excluded from, or marginal to, the political process had a profound effect on the two cultures. To be sure, the circumstances under which this exclusion or marginalization had taken place, whether in the liberal (1949-1967) or the authoritarian (1967-1974) phases of the postwar system, (legal and/or political disenfranchisement of those associated, or suspected of association, with the vanquished side in the civil war; massive internal migration to the cities; a rapid swelling of already large petit bourgeois strata; the integration of these newcomers into a variety of low-productivity employments; the vast expansion of an already overinflated and hydrocephalous state- and wider-public sector; and their strong links to the mechanisms of a powerful underground economy which vastly expanded over time) had directly affected the underdog culture. More specifically, the collective and individual experiences of bitterness, frustration, resentment, and deprivation associated with the exclusion and marginalization of these dislocated and ideologically disoriented but upwardly mobile strata during the post war period greatly reinforced the imagery of injustice and inequity that are salient characteristics of this culture.

The incorporation of these strata into the political system, brought about by the 1974 transition to democracy and the legal end of the civil war which it symbolized, inaugurated a significant reversal of this situation. A structural characteristic of this incorporation was the

autonomous participation of these newly emancipated strata into an open and fully-competitive political system. In turn, emancipation and autonomy were intimately related to the legalization of the communist parties and, above all, to the establishment of the first noncommunist, mass party in modern Greek history, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK).[26] Given its astoundingly rapid initial growth and its enduring presence as one of the major political formations in postauthoritarian Greece, PASOK deserves particular attention in this context. As I have argued elsewhere, its founding positively affected the structure of Greek politics in a number of specific ways: by setting in motion the process whereby the two major Greek political formations, the Center and the Right, were transformed from parties of notables into mass parties; by providing for the ideological and political rehabilitation of formerly excluded or marginalized strata; by creating new political space, i.e., the Center-Left, never before occupied by a significant and enduring Greek political formation; by commensurately expanding the Greek political spectrum; by giving specific institutional and culturally-substantive content to national reconciliation for the first time since the civil war; by greatly increasing political participation; and by contributing to the most significant renewal of the Greek political class since the 1910 elections which confirmed Eleftherios Venizelos's rise to a position of preeminence in Greek politics.[27]

The normalization, rationalization, and democratization of Greek politics which these developments implied greatly enhanced the reformist culture's momentum and provided it with a new dynamic centering on the prospects for further

reform and for the development of durable structures and institutions capable of further expanding the scope of democratization and of substantively contributing to its deepening.

The quest for the deepening of democracy as well as for the enlargement of its scope took a variety of forms. Underpinning all of these, however, was the desire to bring Greek politics and economy closer to the norms and patterns prevailing in the advanced industrial democracies of Europe. Central to such a conceptualization of democratic deepening was the acceptance of the social role of the state and of market liberalization within the context of a mixed economy as axial aspects of political and economic reform. The insertion into the pertinent articles of the new Greek constitution of provisions concerning the social role of the state constituted the most concrete evidence that these concerns of the reformist culture had entered the mainstream of Greek political discourse. The same was true on the level of economics, where the renewed sense of urgency concerning the need for reform designed to render Greek economic structures more competitive was poignantly underscored by the decision to apply for admission to the European Economic Community. In this context, it is especially significant that the official rationale for the Greek application to the Community gave precedence to the need to shore up democratic politics and structures in Greece and paid less attention to economic restructuring and revitalization.[28]

Taken together, these and associated developments constituted tangible evidence of the way in which the imagery and symbolism so closely identified with central assumptions of the reformist culture were shaping the moral discourse of

the incorporative moment in the postauthoritarian period and promoting the further evolution of Greek political democracy towards additional reform, institutionalization, and rationalization of its structures.

From the very beginning of the postauthoritarian period, democratization occupied a central position in the discourse of the underdog culture, as well. Derived from shared assumptions concerning democracy deeply-rooted in this culture, its cognitive content was qualitatively different from the one the reformist culture attached to this concept. Reduced to its essentials, democratization, in the context of the underdog culture, involved two temporally interconnected but analytically distinct processes: the first, was marked by the triumphant rise to political equality and subsequent political and ideological ascendancy of the social forces adhering to this culture. Graphically captured by the green rising sun used by PASOK as its major symbol, this process constituted the essence of what I have called the incorporative moment in postauthoritarian Greek politics and culture. In however inchoate and inarticulate ways, it expressed the profound sense of exhilaration and satisfaction brought about by the political rehabilitation and self-assertion of erstwhile marginalized and excluded strata. The coming of PASOK to power in 1981 at the vanguard of what had become known as the country’s "progressive forces" marked the high point in these strata’s long march to political power. The imagery of hope radiated by PASOK’s green sun pervaded an extraordinarily large part of the Greek political landscape and signaled the definitive reversal of years of political discrimination, repression, and exclusion.

Obscured by the euphoria generated by the triumphant side of the incorporative moment, a second and qualitatively more significant process slowly became discernible and acquired increasing momentum and salience. It was a process of critical long-term importance for the type of democracy envisaged by the underdog culture. Central to its imagery were prominent features of this culture which gradually came to the fore and increasingly dominated the political discourse of the 1970s and early 1980s. The more salient of these were: (a) a leveling egalitarianism especially salient in the world view of the petit bourgeois, agrarian, and working class strata most closely identified with this culture and bent on attaining greater social equality through redistributive rather than production-oriented mechanisms designed to bring the more economically- privileged strata down to the level of the less privileged; (b) a distinct preference for the unmediated exercise of power and, hence, towards charismatic leadership; (c) a consequent indifference and even hostility for intermediary institutions and structures; (d) a compensatory sense of justice distinguished by the inchoate but powerful desire to settle old scores and to compensate for past sufferings; (e) a powerful and pervasive populist ideology replete with manichean and reductionist logics; and (f) fiercely particularistic and appropriative attitudes concerning social benefits and reflecting, among others, this culture’s profound diffidence towards capitalism and the market operation as well as its distinct preference for protectionist arrangements and, more generally, entitlements.

The notion of entitlements is crucial for an understanding of the type of democracy and democratic

politics fostered by the underdog culture. Stripped to its essentials, it represented an attempt politically, socially, and economically to empower the least competitive political and social forces in Greece and, in so doing, to facilitate their reproduction under the new conditions prevailing in Greece at the time. Threatened, as they were, by the prospect of further rationalization of political and economic practices inherent in the alternative conception of democracy envisaged by forces identified with the reformist culture, these extensive and recently empowered strata sought refuge in a populist democracy ostensibly capable of ensuring their long-term survival by securing for them politically strong positions in a variety of structures, such as political parties, trade unions, cooperatives, the state- and the wider public sector, the prefecture councils.

This populist conception of democracy constituted the single most dominant characteristic of what I have termed the incorporative moment in the postauthoritarian period. Though clearly on the ascendant from the early years following the transition to democracy in Greece, it reached its apogee during the 1981-85 quadrennium, when PASOK's advent to power made it possible to realize many of these goals and to erect a powerful set of defensive structures capable of providing effective protection for the vested interests represented by these strata. In this specific sense, the Greek underdog culture can be said to have served as the logic of integration during the first decade of the postauthoritarian period. The powerful populist discourse which it generated during this incorporative moment acted as a potent ideological instrument in a bid to solidify its emerging ascendancy and to render dominant its particularist essence.[29]

In this context, it is worth repeating once more that, as in the past, the two rival cultures did not, in this period as well, neatly coincide with any one particular party. A careful reading of the evidence amply confirms that if a populist conception of democracy was a more salient aspect of the discourse articulated by PASOK and the KKE, similar views were voiced within the conservative camp. The reductionist logic which often pervaded New Democracy's utterings and imagery (e.g., the play on words countering PASOK's central message of "allaghi" (=change [from the past]) with New Democracy's call for "apallaghi" (=riddance or deliverance [from PASOK]) constituted strong evidence that populism, which, it should be noted, had played an important role in the discourse articulated by the colonels' authoritarian regime, was not an exclusive preserve of the nonconservative forces. That this was so was amply confirmed by the distinct identification with central precepts of the reformist culture of the tiny Communist Party of Greece-Interior (KKE-Esoterikou) on the Left, the reformist wing of PASOK centering around Professor Kostas Simitis, or the liberal branch of New Democracy headed by George Rallis. In short, the two cultures cut, to a very large degree, across the major Greek political parties and defied facile, unidimensional identifications with partisan structures.[30]

The European dimension of Greek politics. The third element of structural change in postauthoritarian Greek politics and society, which profoundly affected the rival cultural traditions, springs from the decision to enter the European Community. Accession to the European Community was especially important for the reformist culture. Its significance should be understood at two interconnected

levels. The first has already been alluded to: entry into the Community held out the prospect for both political and economic rationalization and reform--concepts central to the reformist culture. The Community was seen as a guarantor for democratic stability and enhanced security as well as a catalyst for much-needed structural change. Finally, entry in the Community conferred upon Greece the privileged status of belonging in the same exclusive "club" as the "developed" and "advanced" countries of the first-world.[31]

At a deeper level, however, entry into the Community and the prospects for ever-growing integration into an increasingly larger network of Community institutions, processes, and cultural traditions should be understood as having set in motion an enormously powerful long-term process which, though originating outside Greece, was to become an integral part of the domestic political scene and profoundly to affect the structure and evolution of the country's political, economic, and cultural settings. In a very specific sense, it can be argued that the special weight of this "external" factor and the unquestionable momentum it imparted in the reformist Greek culture created a unique historic opportunity for the latter to emerge as the permanently ascendant logic of integration in Greek society and politics and to serve, henceforth, as the dominant cultural discourse framing the parameters for the debates concerning the country's future evolution within the broader international and European system.

Put somewhat differently, the Community can, from this perspective, properly be regarded as a powerful force potentially capable of providing sufficient support and momentum for the social and political forces adhering to the

reformist culture to bring about the reforms, rationalization of structures, and overall changes in Greek polity and economy necessary for the country's fuller integration into the rapidly evolving mechanisms of the Community and to ensure its capacity to benefit commensurately from them.

The capacity of the Community to act as a powerful spur in support of reform stems from its peculiar position as an institution which is at once external as well as internal with respect to the member states. The external dimension makes it possible for Community organs to maintain a certain distance from their national counterparts and to make use of their special weight as agents of a supranational (or, minimally, a trans-national) entity in order to search for consensual solutions to delicate problems, and to foster the emergence of new arrangements capable of promoting restructuring and rationalisation across national borders. The internal dimension, on the other hand, allows these same institutions to monitor developments in the member states more effectively, to create strong and intimate linkages with domestic actors supportive of the structural changes envisaged by the Community, and to gain a better understanding of the measures needed in order to render the human and social cost of necessary changes more bearable.

Three major implications arising from this development deserve comment. First, the conceptual-ization of the Community as the conditio sine qua non for structural changes in Greek politics and economy and as the crucial locomotive force which will sufficiently empower the domestic exponents of the reformist culture to effect necessary change poignantly highlights the structural weaknesses of these forces and their historical inability to overcome the

tenacious resistance of strata adhering to the underdog culture and permanently to impose the reformist culture as the dominant logic of integration in the country.

Second, such an eventuality was certain to be, and indeed was, perceived as posing a mortal threat to the social and political forces identifying with the underdog culture and, more generally, as constituting a supreme challenge to some of its axial principles. As such, it was bound to generate fierce resistance, emotional reaction, and visceral opposition that were only partially offset by the material benefits which membership bestowed upon the less competitive segments of Greek society--adherents, by definition, of the underdog culture.

Third, as a result of the above considerations, the debates concerning the Community were from the very start invested with enormous amount of affect which tellingly pointed to the radically different ways by which each of the rival cultures internalized the significance of Greek accession to the Community. Viewed especially from the perspective of the underdog culture, the Community was, thus, bound to be perceived in demonological terms--a development which constituted eloquent testimony to the intensity of feeling, fear, and threat that the prospects for structural change with which it was identified produced among the adherents of this culture.[32]

The intensity of opposition which the European Community produced within the underdog culture (at least until the material benefits of accession became tangible in the early 1980s) is better understood, if placed in the additional context of the sudden and meteoric rise of Greek socialism during the years of the incorporative moment.

Rooted in deeply-ambivalent attitudes towards capitalism, long-ingrained in this culture, Greek socialism, in the specifically populist content and meaning which Andreas Papandreou and the dominant current within PASOK imparted to it during the past 19 years, heavily drew upon, and imaginatively brought together, a number of shared assumptions central to the definition of the underdog culture and of the extensive social strata adhering to it. Chief among these are (a) a powerful affective preference for small structures and for the unmediated conduct of human relations which this implies--a phenomenon reflecting, among others, the fact that Greece has the largest percentage of petty-commodity producers in all of the European Community; (b) a strong dislike of competition in the operation of the market; (c) a distinct bias for state protection designed to ensure the perpetuation of unproductive units and structures in an enormous range of social and economic activities; (d) a fear of large and impersonal structures and of the processes of reform and rationalization associated with advanced industrial capitalism and, more generally, with the economic, political, and cultural dominance of the West; and (e) a leveling egalitarianism characterized by a zero-sum view of the world and permeated by a reductionist logic and a conception of social justice which assigns primacy to the redistribution of resources while ignoring or disparaging production and growth, and failing to appreciate the need to link these three functions over time.

In a very real sense, then, Greek socialism served as a powerful and effective channel for the articulation and amplification of the polemical and defensive reactions which the implications of entry in the Community produced among the

underdog culture's adherents. Admittedly, these reactions became gradually and partially tempered, as significant parts of the social strata especially identified with the underdog culture became the major beneficiaries of a massive inflow of Community funds in the years following accession in 1981.[33]

The instrumental legitimacy of the Community which the bestowing of material benefits thus brought about could not, however, obscure the deeper threat which the European option posed to the long-term viability of these strata. This deeper meaning of entry into the Community and its critical importance for the way in which the underdog culture reproduces itself and renegotiates its own identity became more discernible in the post-1985 period, when the moment of incorporation reached its natural limits and Greek politics and society entered the period I have called the "moment of entrenchment." It is with an examination of the nature and dynamics of this "moment" which extends down to the present that we shall conclude our analysis of the relationship between culture and politics in postauthoritarian Greece.

The moment of entrenchment. If 1974 launched the exuberant phase in postauthoritarian politics which I have called its incorporating moment, 1985, by contrast, inaugurated a reverse trend and ushered in a period during which the underdog culture and its political and ideological carriers (a) experienced a distinct loss of momentum and (b) increasingly resorted to defensive strategies designed to prevent the erosion of gains realized during the incorporative moment and to ensure their continuing capacity to play a central, though perhaps no longer ascendant, role in Greek politics. Success in the pursuit of this strategy has meant that the heretofore ascendant forces adhering to

the underdog culture have effectively emerged as the confining condition inhibiting further rationalization and modernization of the Greek political system. As such, this development entitles us to regard this period of postauthoritarian Greek politics as its "moment of entrenchment." At the same time, the inability of the reformist culture to overcome these confining conditions has resulted in a period of pronounced and prolonged indeterminacy which remains the single most salient feature of Greek politics as the country searches its way through the final decade of the century.

Two qualitatively different processes, one domestic and one international, account for the sharp reversal in the fortunes of the underdog culture observable after 1985. Somewhat ironically, the former had its origins in the years following PASOK's triumphant advent to power in 1981 and the rise, in the wake of that event, of the erstwhile marginal and excluded forces in Greek society to a position of virtually uncontested political and ideological dominance. The euphoria produced by this momentous development and the high and unrealistic expectations accompanying it obscured a fundamental contradiction inherent in it. To wit, that the calls for the major social and political restructuring of Greek society, so prominent in the imagery and rhetoric espoused by these forces, (a) directly threatened the very social structure in which they were embedded, (b) sharply undermined axial principles of the underdog culture, and (c) ran counter to their deep social conservatism. In this sense, the major dilemma which confronted PASOK and the Communist Party of Greece, the political formations which, at the time, most prominently expressed the inchoate and

contradictory interests of these strata was twofold: (a) whether they would, over time, prove capable of acting as the vehicle for transcending the resistance of these strata in bringing about the transformation necessary for their integration in a more rationalized and significantly restructured Greek society, economy, and polity; or, conversely, (b) whether, failing to do so, they would end up as the hostage(s) rather than the leader(s) of these strata.[34]

The great expectations generated by the electoral victory of nonconservative political forces for virtually the first time in more than 45 years effectively obscured, at first, the incapacity of the victorious constellation effectively to move in the direction of the former option. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to state that this incapacity--born of the formidable resistance to meaningful change put up by the adherents of the underdog culture--manifested itself in what soon became a familiar pattern: (a) the increasing tendency to privilege rhetoric and symbols concerning restructuring and modernization over concrete and substantive measures designed to bring these about; and (b) the systematic recourse to policies steeped in the logic of "compensatory justice" and designed to offer adherents of the underdog culture material or symbolic benefits which sought to balance out the sufferings and deprivations associated with exclusion or marginalization from politics in previous periods of Greek history.

The effective outcome of these policies was a major redistribution of massive material and symbolic resources controlled by the state in favor of the forces adhering to the underdog culture. If the enormous expansion of the

state- and wider-public sector which occurred during this period constituted the most tangible evidence of such redistribution of resources, it is important to note that, given low rates of economic growth and declining productivity, a major source of funding for these resources was externally derived. More specifically, increased borrowing in the international markets and, especially, direct transfers from the European Community--an item of increasing magnitude as time went on--became the primary source of funds used to support the least competitive strata in Greek society without commensurate attempts at reform or restructuring. The result was the political, economic, psychological, and ideological empowerment of these forces, the strengthening of the structures of their power, and the effective postponement of sorely-needed modernization, rationalization, and restructuring in the country.[35]

To be sure, the post-1981 period did witness some structural reform. Most notable was the change in the civil code concerning the rights of women, arguably one of the most significant reforms brought about by PASOK during these years. Another was the passage of legislation designed to bring about decentralization in what traditionally has been an extraordinarily centralized state. This reform, however, was undermined in its application stage by policy considerations reflecting the paramount significance which the government of the day and its political and social allies and supporters assigned to "compensating" loyal adherents for past wrongs, real or perceived, and to providing tangible and material correctives capable of effectively addressing the powerful affective needs which the long-standing sense of

inequity and injustice pervading the underdog culture has generated among its adherents.

Where tangible and material "compensation" was not possible, either because of the finite nature of resources available for distribution or simply because specific circumstances did not offer themselves for such a solution, the powerful populist discourse employed by PASOK and sustained by the underdog culture served as an effective mechanism of symbolic compensation. The highly imaginative and inventive use of symbols, imagery, and language resorted to for that purpose became a central feature of the period and underscored the way in which a rhetoric which addressed particularistic needs long associated with the underdog culture was an essential element of the principle of compensatory justice by which the government of the day sought to secure its hold over ever-widening sectors of what, in a classically populist conceptualization, it called the "90 per cent of the population which comprises the non-privileged strata in Greek society."[36]

International affairs constitutes a classic example of an area where the principle of compensatory justice was, in the absence of available tangible and material benefits, applied at the symbolic and rhetorical level. The frequency with which the Greek government differentiated its position from that of its allies in formal communiques of the European Community or NATO; the refusal to condemn the downing of the Korean Airlines plane by the Soviet air force; the verbal support offered to the Jaruzelski regime in its confrontation with Solidarity forces; the maintenance of close contacts with the Palestinian Liberation Organization; the declarations in favor of the Sandinistas and the Arab cause,

as well as the numerous frictions in US- Greek relations were only partially due to the desire to establish the fact that Greece could no longer be regarded as an obedient satellite of the West. Equally significant was the fact that such behavior, which sought convincingly to demonstrate Greece's capacity to pursue an independent foreign policy and to underscore its ability to act as a sovereign state, had its roots in the deeply ingrained feelings of injustice, inadequacy, bitterness, and humiliation long-associated within the context of the underdog culture with Greece's experience in international affairs and especially in the country's relations with Great Powers. The ultimate object of these policies was, therefore, decidedly domestic: to establish, at however symbolic a level and for the benefit of adherents of the underdog culture, that Greece and, in particular, the political forces representing this cultural tradition were, at long last, capable of standing up to powers perceived to have wronged the country in the past and, thus, able to compensate for past injustices and humiliations.[37]

Judged from a narrowly political perspective, the use of the principle of compensatory justice as a mechanism for promoting the ascendancy of the underdog culture proved a success. Along with the political and psychological empowerment of the forces adhering to that culture, it also ensured their permanent presence at the center stage of Greek politics. The hidden and longer-term cost of such a policy, however, was the depletion of material and symbolic capital available to the government of the day and the exhaustion, within the short span of four years, of the momentum driving forward the incorporative moment in the politics of

postauthoritarian Greece.

This abrupt reversal in scenery became abundantly clear in October 1985, right after PASOK's reelection, in June of that year, had ensured that the same constellation of forces would remain politically ascendant for four more years. At that time, major, unproductive outlays of state funds (which, over the previous four years, had been disbursed in accordance with the rationality of the underdog culture), sharply increased state indebtedness, and wasteful preelectoral spending combined to produce an acute economic crisis which could only be confronted through recourse to an austere stabilization program. At that moment, political life in postauthoritarian Greece symbolically and substantively entered its moment of entrenchment--a period marked, above all, by two antithetical developments: (a) the implicit recognition that the policies of the previous four years could no longer be sustained without severe adverse repercussions and that the rationalization of economic and political structures could no longer be postponed without profoundly negative results for economy, politics, and society. Indeed, the appointment to the post of Minister of National Economy of Kostas Simitis, a respected academic long an advocate of reform and rationalization underscored the significance of the shift; and (b) the ideological and political retreat of the forces supporting the underdog culture coupled by the latters' determination tenaciously to safeguard and defend recently secured entitlements.[38]

At the level of cultural discourse and of the relation between culture and politics which constitutes the central focus of this paper, the imposition of an austerity program in October 1985 symbolizes the latest reversal in the long

and continuing struggle for supremacy between the country's two rival cultures. The clear message contained in the 1985 austerity program was that the logic of reform intimately identified with the younger of the two Greek cultures was, at this point in Greek historical development, becoming ascendant in the field of politics and economics. And, however precariously, this ascendancy it seems to have retained down to the present, despite the fact that the abandonment of the austerity program in 1987, the unceremonious dismissal of its primary architect, the last wave of PASOK's profligate spending in the period 1987-89, and many of the policies of New Democracy in the early 1990s created the impression that the forces of the underdog culture were, once again, on the offensive.

In fact, I would argue that, seen with the benefit of the hindsight provided by the last eight years, these developments can be read in exactly the opposite way: as the first of a series of rearguard actions by the forces associated with the underdog culture, rendered all the more desperate and shrill, over time, by the realization that the imperatives of rationalization, restructuring, and reform were becoming extraordinarily pressing and that the accomplishment of the structural changes in politics, economy, and society which these entailed would eventually but inevitably result in the permanent marginalization of the underdog culture and the permanent ascendancy of its rival which would, henceforth, be able to act as the logic of integration for Greek society, culture, and politics.[39]

I have argued, throughout this paper, that a structural characteristic of both cultural traditions has been their inability successfully to translate temporary into permanent

ascendancy, let alone hegemony. In view of that, what accounts for the assertion just made that, in the past eight years or so, the preconditions for a renewed and potentially permanent ascendancy of the reformist culture seem to be on the rise? An answer to this question brings us to the international context of the moment of entrenchment in postauthoritarian Greece.

Succinctly put, I would argue that the increasing integration of Greece into the European Community and the consequent need to adjust its economic and political structures to those of the Community constitutes the single most important force which, acting as an unequivocal ally of the forces adhering to the reformist culture, is slowly but inexorably helping to tip the balance of Greek historical development in favor of the permanent ascendancy of that culture.

More specifically, accession to the Community in 1981 inaugurated for Greece a period of gradual incorporation and integration in a complex, transnational process of economic and, over time, political restructuring, reform, and rationalization. Whatever the national variations of this transnational process, its outcomes were certain to include the gradual marginalization and contraction of uncompetitive, inefficient, and archaic structures in each member state. For Greec of self-employed artisans and petty commodity producers; the country with the most inflated state- and wider public sector in the Community; and the country with one of the largest percentages of the labor force employed in what is a predominantly minifundist agricultural sector, the long-term implications of integration in the Community can only imply major restructuring of both economic and political practices

as well as institutions and the commensurate contraction of strata associated with these uncompetitive and, in many ways, precapitalist structures. In short, the long-term implications of integration constitute a direct threat to the ideological and political underpinnings of the underdog culture.

It was for this reason that the prospect of accession to the Community originally generated such acrimony and opposition among the social forces adhering to that culture, especially during the period prior to 1981. In the years following accession and, especially, during PASOK's second term of office (1985-89)--a period which coincided with the ascendancy of the underdog culture's most vocal political exponents--acrimony and opposition were gradually translated into instrumental accommodation. While retaining intact the culture's diffidence and opposition to the strategic goals of integration, instrumental accommodation made it possible to utilize to the fullest the opportunities for short-term gains deriving from membership in the Community. In practical terms, this meant that major transfers of Community funds intended to facilitate the structural adjustment of the country's less competitive sectors to the broader requirements of the common market and, more generally, the Community were consistently diverted to income-enhancing measures benefiting these sectors but effectively nullifying the restructuring intent and rationale underlying the Community programs through which such funds were made available to Greece.[40]

The "milch cow" syndrome with respect to the Community became particularly observable during the late years of PASOK's term in office, the period I have termed the moment

of entrenchment in postauthoritarian Greek politics. In a period increasingly characterized by the perceptible decline in the fortunes of the underdog culture; by disillusionment concerning unrealized goals; by demoralization and defensiveness regarding the future; by recourse to an aggressive but misguided populist discourse which belittled institutions and promoted the arbitrary and often abusive exercise of power in the name of the people; and by a series of minor or major financial scandals which bred a climate of cynicism and disaffection, the Community was, more than ever before, regarded, for the most, as the last frontier for the extraction of resources capable of supporting quick-enrichment schemes or of serving as stop-gap measures designed to deal with growing deficits.[41]

The advent of New Democracy to power in 1990 did not significantly change this picture. The Community was still regarded as the source of manna originating from the European heaven in Brussels and schemes steeped in a particularist logic abounded. On the other hand, the prolonged austerity program which the country had to confront for almost the entire duration of the conservative government's presence in office cast the whole scene in a somewhat different, though not necessarily a better, light. The halting and inept way in which the privatization program was handled by the government gravely undermined its credibility, produced eloquent evidence of the enormous conflicts between "reformers" and "underdogs" within the government and the ruling party, and significantly slowed down the already sluggish pace of reform.

The crucial other side of this coin, however, was that such practices led directly to two developments: first, they

rendered Community officials and agencies familiar with many of the shared assumptions of the underdog culture informing Greek attitudes and behavior vis-a-vis the EC. In turn, greater familiarity made possible the gradual development of measures and practices designed to enhance the capacity of Community organs more effectively to scrutinize and enforce EC policies within Greece. Second, and more importantly, they resulted in the increasing opening of Greek structures to Community agencies, organs, and policies and commensurately enhanced the latters' capacity to exercise direct or indirect influence at multiple levels of Greek affairs.

The combined impact of these two developments became increasingly discernible beginning in the second half of the decade of the 1980s, once, that is, a sufficient amount of time had elapsed from Greek accession to make possible both the requisite accumulation of knowledge and experience on the part of Community organs and their direct insinuation into critical areas of Greek politics, economy, and society. As such, it coincided with the resurgence of the reformist culture as the ascendant element in postauthoritarian Greek politics and has acted as an increasingly important ally of the social and political forces adhering to that culture.

This heightened presence of the Community in the political and cultural struggles of postauthoritarian Greece became especially evident once, under the combined weight of scandals, declining economic performance, and widespread disillusionment, PASOK lost its majority in 1989 and, following a series of inconclusive elections, New Democracy, the party most closely identified with the "European option", came to power on a platform stressing, above all, the need

for reform. More specifically, New Democracy's program envisaged (a) the radical contraction of the overinflated state- and wider public sector by means of both privatization of many state-owned or state-controlled enterprises and the rationalization of the overstaffed and inefficient public bureaucracy; (b) the liberalization of the Greek market; and (c) the promotion of more competitive and rational structures which will enable Greek polity, economy, and society to align itself more closely with its European partners and reverse the trends towards the country's increasing marginalization within the Community that had occurred over much of the preceding decade.

Within this context, three factors objectively increased the Community's role as a potent agent of rationalization and reform in Greek economy and polity: first, the new government's stated political willingness to espouse Community goals and explicitly to foster reform and restructuring; second, the forced recourse to major borrowing from the Community which the new government had to resort to in an effort to stave off a short-term crisis relating to massive budget deficits; and third, the particularly stringent terms imposed by the Community in approving a $2.2 billion loan in early 1991. Chief among these was the explicit requirement that funds disbursed under the terms of the loan would be utilized to promote needed structural adjustments and the provision that to ensure adherence to the terms disbursement of the loan would be effected in installments. The specific and uncharacteristically blunt language pointing to the need for reform of the public administration to enhance the capacity of the Greek state to implement necessary rationalization and restructuring

measures and the repeated signals emanating from the highest of Community organs pressing for movement in the direction of reform constituted additional tangible evidence of the extent to which the Community acts as a powerful force promoting policies and ideas long-identified with the reformist culture in Greece.[42]

To be sure, the realization of reform (and all that it implies) ultimately depends on the capacity of the domestic social actors identifying with this tradition successfully to profit from the powerful external support provided by the Community and its multiple structures and sufficiently to enhance their own position within Greek society, economy, and politics in order to overcome the confining conditions to the permanent ascendancy of the reformist culture which the tenacious resistance of the strata adhering to the underdog culture ultimately represents. Success in this direction would suggest that the forces identified with reform and modernization in Greece have managed (a) to overcome their historic inability to translate their temporary ascendancy into a permanent one; (b) to serve as the logic of integration in Greek culture and politics; and (c) to open the way for their eventual hegemony and the long- term marginalization and eclipse of the underdog culture. Evidence drawn from the utterances of the increasingly vocal and powerful Greek Federation of Industries, leadership of the General Confederation of Greek Workers, the country's major labor union organ, and, more generally, structures representing the more competitive strata in Greek society seems to offer tentative support for such a diagnosis.[43]

It is precisely the prospect of such an eventuality which explains the intensity of the reaction generated by the

strata identified with the underdog culture in the course of the last few years in Greece. The semi-continuous mobilization and protests of employees in the woefully inefficient civil bureaucracy and the wider public sector in opposition to measures (e.g., transfers, lay-offs, reorganization of inefficient operations, consolidation of ailing retirement funds, etc.) designed to enhance efficiency and rationalize operations; and the quasi- permanent agitation among extensive artisan and self- employed strata over the prospect of changes in work schedules, legislation concerning part-time employment, and, more generally, measures meant to bring about greater flexibility in the labor market constitute concrete and powerful evidence of a social and political retrenchment designed to safeguard vested interests and to forestall any change in the existing, highly-protected, uncompetitive, and, in many ways, archaic system of state and market organization. It is in this sense that observers of the Greek scene speak of the ideological power and enormous tenacity of a "guild-type mentality" in the country, in an attempt to capture and to convey the logic of resistance and of defense inherent in the strategies and practices employed by these embattled sectors.[44]

Two major conclusions, one socioeconomic and one political, can be drawn from this state of affairs which, above all else, graphically captures the relationship between culture and politics in contemporary Greece. First, that the capacity of the less competitive and threatened strata tenaciously to defend their vested interests and the shared assumptions of the underdog culture has produced what I should like to call a structured indeterminacy in the Greek polity and society. The chief characteristic of this

phenomenon is the quasi-suspended nature of Greek historical development, its pronounced rigidities, and the increasingly slower pace with which the country attempts to follow the rapidly evolving European scene.

If, according to the analysis offered here, the domestic forces favoring the reformist culture manage to benefit from the critical support afforded them by growing Greek linkages with the European integration movement to tip the historical balance of forces in their favor, this moment of suspension--whatever its actual temporal length--may well constitute the swan song of a powerful cultural tradition that has played a critical and oftentimes dominant role in Greek political life since the inception of the modern Greek state. In this case, it may be proper to think of the coming years as a period in Greek history which parallels the experiences so movingly captured by Arthur Miller in his Death of a Salesman. If so, the great challenge for the Greek state and for the social and political exponents of the reformist culture will be to provide for the requisite measures (e.g., retraining, support for alternative forms of employment consonant with newly acquired skills, restructuring pension funds to provide for a more rational distribution of available manpower in the market), which will ease as much as possible the significant social dislocation and the human as well as psychological costs associated with this painful but inevitable (and, according to many, necessary) process.

If, indeed, the scenario concerning the "Greek version" of the Death of a Salesman is borne out, its long-term impact on Greek society, culture, and politics is likely to be profound. As such it warrants a more in-depth examination.

Although scholarly studies of this phenomenon are still lacking, both journalistic accounts and, especially, economic indicators published, among others, by respected organizations, such as ICAP Hellas and the Institute of Economic and Industrial Research (IOVE), which is close to the powerful Federation of Greek Industries, amply confirm the emergence of clear trends in that direction.

The most tangible pertinent evidence is the emergence of a clear dualism in the market which tends to draw a sharp line of demarcation between large, well capitalized, and efficiently managed firms that seem capable of successfully confronting the challenges of a new and more competitive market and small units that are not, because they lack some or most of these attributes, particularly capital and modern management. By the same token, these same trends also point to the growing concentration of these markets in the hands of fewer firms. To be sure, these trends are clearly visible in certain market sectors, discernible in some others, and not easily identifiable in quite a few. Still, given the dynamism and the growth rates of the markets in which they do occur as well as their conformity to similar developments in the international economy, it is reasonable to regard them as harbingers of things to come rather than isolated or idiosyncratic phenomena, peculiar to the Greek market and not capable of serving as a sufficiently firm foundation for generalization.[45]

More specifically, evidence drawn from major sections of economic activity, such as foods and beverages, garments, dairy products, and, more generally, the retail industry strongly supports the structural dualism argument. In all these cases, the past few years have witnessed the rapid rise

of large industrial or commercial units which quickly captured a significant and growing percentage of their respective markets and contributed to the commensurate erosion of the dominant share of these markets traditionally held by small, greatly undercapitalized, family-held units, staffed by one or two (and certainly less than five) individuals, and catering to a limited, local, if not neighborhood, clientele. Salient examples of such units are the Boutari group of companies in the beverage sector; the Delta and Fage companies in dairy products; and the growing number of super market chains, in which Alpha-Beta Vassilopoulos, Marinopoulos, Sklavenites, and Veropoulos figure prominently. The recent entry into this market of foreign firms such as Continent, Makro, and Gotzen serves to underscore the trend. In the garment sector, the trend for structural change manifests itself most clearly in the emergence of so-called "shop in a shop" department stores which, following international practice, adopt the logic of shopping centers that lease part of their space to other retailers of specialized and eponymous products and derive revenue either from rent or from a percentage of the sales realized by each such shop. Included in this category are such venerable names of the Greek retail industry as Lambropoulos and Minion which, in recent years, have passed under new and dynamic management and have significantly transformed their profiles. The entry into the same scene of such international names as Marks and Spencer further underscores the same trend.[46]

The reaction of the traditional, artisan sector to the reality and implications of this emerging structural dualism is based on a twin strategy: first, to defend existing

arrangements geared to the administrative regulation of the market through mostly premodern or archaic mechanisms designed to impede competition; and second, to contain the pressures for change emanating from the modern sector through resort to the mobilization of organizational, legal, and political resources available to the embattled underdog sector.[47]

Whatever their success, these defensive measures are unlikely to prove effective in the long-run. The growing number of bankruptcies in the garment industry, the rising incidence of mergers or takeovers in the retail food industry, and the emerging dominance of super market chains suggests that the pressures favoring the rationalization of the market are formidable. Given this situation, it appears likely that, over the next few years the traditionally overgrown, self-employed sector, currently the largest within the European Community, will experience a very significant contraction in Greece, as more and more owners of small and uncompetitive firms will be gradually forced to abandon the honorable tradition of (often precarious) independence that has long been the hallmark of Greek society.

Such an eventuality should be understood at two levels: on the one hand, it will tend to underscore the extent to which changes in Greek economy and society tend to follow the logic of similar transformation experienced by other societies, as they negotiated critical moments of their own developmental trajectories and of their transitions to modernity. Given, however, both the weaknesses of Greek capitalism and the tenacity as well as sheer size of the self-employed strata, the Greek version of this process is likely to be characterized by certain idiosyncratic features which will allow both for significant

movement in the direction of consolidation, rationalization, and modernization and for the survival, for a considerable time, of smaller units under qualitatively different forms.

More specifically, the move away from a single, massive sector of self-employment towards more differentiated patterns of employment is likely to assume at least three forms: franchising, subcontracting, and wage labor--the latter constituting the polar opposite of self-employment in the conceptual continuum defined by the two. Already very visible and rapidly expanding arrangements in the Greek market, franchising and subcontracting possess two major advantages as, admittedly very different, forms of entrepreneurial organization: functionally, they allow for the significant infusion of capital, organizational, and managerial skills into the production process, thereby directly contributing to the modernization of attitudes, and practices in the segment of the labor force affected by them. Ideologically, they provide a protective shield for that segment of the self-employed labor force, whose strong affective commitment to "independent employment" makes it enormously resistant to the idea of dependent, i.e., wage, labor. Given these particular features, these forms of labor organization are likely to attract a large segment of formerly self-employed workers who, for a variety of reasons, remain ambivalent or simply resist their incorporation into wage labor activities.[48]

If borne out be actual events, the practical consequence of such a development will be dual: on the one hand, Greece will continue to be a society where the percentage of its labor force employed in wage labor activities will be lower than that of the more advanced industrial capitalist countries. On the other, the shift in the direction just analyzed will also imply a

commensurate modernization of large segments of the labor force, which is likely to leave its imprint on both attitudes and behavioral patterns affecting politics.[49]

The second major, political conclusion to be drawn from the preceding analysis is that, more than in any previous period in modern Greek history, the social and political strata adhering to, and supporting, each of the two rival cultures cut across the entire Greek political spectrum and do not neatly coincide with one particular party. This conclusion has been poignantly driven home by the realization that the patent inability of New Democracy to implement the program of restructuring and rationalization with which it came to power in 1990 is, above all else, due to the fierce intraparty resistance to the prospect of such implementation put up by extensive social strata loyal to the party but also adhering to the underdog culture.[50]

One result of this development has been an increasing timidity, indeed unwillingness, on the part of all political parties from Right to Left to risk incurring the "political cost" associated with open and determined support for measures which all admit are necessary for the rationalization and restructuring of both economy and polity. Another, more auspicious result, is the increasing activation of organized interests in civil society (e.g., the Federation of Greek Industries [SEB] and its articulate leader, Stelios Argyros; the reformist wing of the General Confederation of Greek Workers [GSEE] led by Lambros Kanellopoulos), which espouse the major shared assumptions of the reformist culture, vocally call for movement in the right direction, and, in the case of SEB and GSEE, take concrete and correct measures designed to bring such movement about.[51]

A major implication of the foregoing analysis is that, underneath the apparent persistence of traditional forms of

economic and social organization, one can discern the emergence of a halting, transformative process that is gradually altering the structure of the Greek economy and society and is imposing on them a logic of change which may be difficult for those opposed to it to elude for long. Seen in this light, three scenarios for the future appear more likely than others. In the first one, the reform forces identified with the reformist culture will successfully utilize the support structures generated by Greece's membership in the European Community to emerge as the dominant political and cultural force in Greek society. This scenario has two potential suboptions, whose individual logics lead to significantly different versions of reformist dominance. The first, which I will call the "divergence suboption" will be marked by the continuing eclipse of the underdog culture and, eventually, by its permanent marginal- ization. The hidden cost of this suboption is that its outcome will be the result of a long, protracted, and agonizing process which is likely to leave its divisive imprint on Greek society and politics for years to come. Though permanently marginalized, the adherents of the underdog culture will constitute a second, "lesser" Greece, whose existence and survival will adversely affect the quality of political life in the country.

Conversely, in the second suboption, the eventual dominance of the reformist culture will arise out of a process of gradual convergence of the two rival cultures, whose most salient feature will be the progressive accommodation of strata historically identified with the underdog culture to central tenets of the reformist culture. Though not readily discernible at present, such an eventuality cannot be ruled out. Its logic derives from significant historical precedent which has recently received renewed attention in connection with the conditions favoring the

consolidation of democratic politics in a number of countries. In this literature, convergence is seen as one of the strategies employed by social forces which, faced with the specter of permanent political marginalization, choose to abandon confrontational politics based on a zero- sum logic in exchange for incorporation into a more moderate political arrangement, which holds out the prospect of eventually coming to power.[52]

Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of the ancien regime in France and of the way in which an old order transforms itself to confront the challenge of modernity constitutes further evidence that the convergence suboption is not logically to be discounted. In this regard, the adaptability exhibited by adherents of the underdog culture who choose to pursue the franchising or subcontracting paths away from self-employment as well as fragmentary evidence pointing to the cautious willingness of labor sectors, such as the construction workers, long identified with the underdog culture, to opt for a survival strategy which basically accepts the logic of reform may serve as further, auspicious indicators that the systems of shared assumptions, and the resulting strategies, tactics, and practices underpinning the long-standing structural opposition of the two cultures may, at long last, be waning, giving way to alternative ones favoring greater moderation and convergence. The transformative dynamic to issue from such a potential development would decisively push forward Greece's transition to modernity and greatly benefit its society, politics, and democracy.[53]

The second, less optimistic, scenario would involve two antithetical processes: an intensification in the dynamic of European integration coupled with continuing Greek lagging in implementing necessary structural changes designed to bring about convergence with the more developed societies in the Community.

Such an eventuality could result in two adverse developments for Greece. It could enhance pressures among the more modern societies and economies in the EC to move to a system of an "Europe a plusieurs vitessses" and would risk relegating Greece to the second or "slower speed". A central assumption of this scenario is that, despite the move towards "multiple speeds," the EC will, for its own political and institutional reasons, continue to support the idea of eventual convergence among member states. In practical terms, this means that the Community will maintain its strong linkages with forces adhering to the reformist Greek culture and will continue to promote the cause of reform in this country. Still, the backlash likely to be generated by the relegation of Greece into the "slower speed" could well enhance the fortunes of the underdog culture, arrest the ascendancy of its reformist rival, and result in protracted indeterminacy. The stagnation which this turn of events is likely to generate would constitute an inhospitable climate for the further deepening of Greek democracy and for the improvement of its quality.

In many ways, the third scenario issues from the second one. Its point of departure is the potentially adverse reactions of EC members states over the prospects for protracted structural indeterminacy in Greece. The likelihood that such a situation will lead to the adoption of policies on the part of the member states whose net effect will be the growing isolation and marginalization of Greece from Community affairs cannot, in such an eventuality, be excluded. Such a turn of events would tend (a) greatly to weaken the power position of the reformist sectors in Greek society, (b) commensurately to enhance the fortunes of the underdog culture, (c) gravely to undermine the prospects for reform in this country, (d) adversely to affect the likelihood

that Greek democracy will continue to evolve along lines stressing its liberal origins and character, and (e) increase the probability that the form of democracy which will prevail will be strongly influenced by the leveling egalitarianism, the search for compensatory justice, the disdain for institutional intermediation, and, more generally, the populist logic that has long been the salient characteristic of the underdog culture.[54]

Shorn of the necessary qualifications and carefully constructed caveats, the central hypothesis informing this study has been that the present historical conjuncture in Greece could constitute a new and major critical juncture, whose salient characteristics would be the end of the cultural dualism that has long bedeviled political life in Greece and the beginning of a period of reformist dominance in the country. Whether in its divergence or convergence suboptions, this is the central assumption informing the first of the three scenarios for the future analyzed above. Time will show, whether this or the other, less optimistic scenarios will be borne out by events and whether or not Greece shall, with some delay, follow the trajectory already traveled by Spain and Italy and currently by Portugal. The quality of Greek political life and, more generally, the nature of democracy in Greece will hang in the balance.[55]

Let me conclude this long essay with a brief reference to an issue which, in Greece, has become the object of attention by respected journalists and academics alike. This concerns whether, in view of what has been extensively analyzed above, it is appropriate to think of the 1980s as a "lost decade." To my knowledge, this concept was first put forward by George Th. Mavrogordatos in a conference held at King’s College, London in 1991 and intended to evaluate developments in Greece during the

1980s. It subsequently appeared in print in a brief article by Nicos C. Alivizatos in the Greek weekly To Vima, which did not adopt this concept, arguing that, despite grave disappointments and missed opportunities, the balance sheet of the decade did not warrant the label "lost." More recently, and in the context of the mounting intensity which characterizes the confrontation between the forces adhering to the rival cultures during the moment of entrenchment, two respected columnists, Panos Loukakos and the late Constantine Calligas, have explicitly adopted the notion of a "lost decade," pointing persuasively to a number of areas, domestic and international alike, where Greece failed, during the past ten years or so, to keep up with its partners and competitors.[56]

Ultimately, the verdict on this matter depends on the context within which one attempts to interpret the developments of the past decade. Viewed from a short-term perspective, there can be little doubt that Greece has signally failed to generate the kind of reform momentum which within an analogous time span allowed Spain to undergo painful but successful restructuring of its economic and political system. The incapacity, indeed unwillingness, of Greek political forces to profit from the opportunities presented by membership in the European Community to bring about necessary rationalization of its structures and the prevalence of the "milch cow" syndrome over the logic of partnership have resulted in a large number of missed opportunities, wasted efforts, and profound disappointments for exponents of reform. And, seen in that light, it would be proper to speak of the decade as "lost".[57]

Though not contesting this analysis and its conclusions, a longer-term perspective and broader context would, I believe, significantly modify this view. A central point of departure for

such a perspective would be the realization that the resurgence of the underdog culture during the past four decades has negatively affected the momentum of its reformist rival and has, in many ways, stalled the process of reform in the country.

On the other hand, it is equally important to note that, to a great extent, the nature and intensity of the positions espoused by the social strata adhering to the underdog culture as well as by their political representatives was directly related to both the feelings of exhilaration and to the quest for compensatory justice brought forward by the end of long-term political marginalization and exclusion long experienced by these forces. And in that sense, one of the triumphs of the political democracy established after 1974 was the capacity to incorporate these forces, to give them equal access to political resources, and, in the process, decisively to contribute to the gradual normalization of Greek politics. In that sense, too, the problems generated by this development, the missed opportunities, the wasted efforts, and the intense disappointments of the past decade may be regarded as the regrettable but necessary price Greek society has had to pay for the long-overdue incorporation of these marginalized strata in the political system, for the dismantling of a post-civil war order based on the institutionalized inequality of citizens, in short, for the normalization of its politics following long and systematic derailment during the preceding quarter century. In that sense, finally, despite the retrogressive moments it gave rise to and the structured indeterminacy which resulted from the empowerment of the forces supporting the underdog culture, the past decade can be regarded as a necessary step in the long, arduous, and slow quest for overcoming the confining conditions that have long thwarted the realization of the Greek reform project and have

adversely affected the quality of Greek democracy.[58]

Acknowledgements

In preparing this short study, I benefited greatly from the valuable information, suggestions, and criticisms offered by a number of colleagues in Greece and elsewhere as well as by those individuals in Greece who kindly agreed to be interviewed and to provide me with their views on the evolving nature of the culture and politics in Greece. In the former group, I wish to thank Peter S. Allen, Michael Herzfeld, and Elizabeth Prodromou for their thorough, lengthy, and substantive comments on an earlier draft of this work. Also John O. Iatrides, Pavlos Kavouras, Paschalis Kitromilides, Andonis Makrydemetres, Adamantia Pollis, Dimitris Sotiropoulos, Stavros Thomadakis, and Susannah Verney for their insightful comments concerning specific points raised in the paper. In the latter group, grateful thanks are due to Messrs. Nicos Adamandiades, Stelios Argyros, Nicos Demou, Lazaros Efraimoglou, Demetres Daskalopoulos, Lambros Kanellopoulos, Andonis Lykiardopoulos, Soteres Loumides, and Mrs. Varvara Vernicou for their interest in this project and, especially, for their willingness to take time from their business commitments to react to the ideas contained in this work.

ENDNOTES

1. On the concept of "political culture," see, among others, Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, ed., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture," in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), vol. 12, 218-25; the classic statement by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little Brown, 1965) as well as idem, The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little Brown, 1980); Lowell Dittmer, "Political Culture and Political Symbolism. Towards a Theoretical Synthesis," World Politics 29:4 (1977), 552-83; and G.M. Patrick, "Political Culture," in Giovanni Sartori, ed., Social Science Concepts (Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage, 1984), 265-314.

2. On the concepts of "modal personality" and "national character," see Lauriston Sharp, "Ralph Linton," Robert E. Lane "Political Personality," and George A. DeVos, "National Character," respectively in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), vol. 9, 389; vol. 12, 15; and vol. 11, 14-18. See also Alex Inkeles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: the Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), vol. 2, 970-1020. On the use of "political culture" as an attempt to move beyond "national character," see also Almond and Verba, The Civic

Culture, 11n6. For the Greek case, see the atheoretical study by the historian Apostolos E. Vakalopoulos, Ho Charakteras ton Hellenon. Anichnevontas ten ethnike mas taftoteta [The Character of the Greeks. Tracing Our National Identity] (Thessaloniki: By the Author, 1983).

3. On the rising significance of culture in the social sciences and, more particularly, in the study of politics, see, among others, Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984); Pierre R. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Michael Herzfeld, Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Mike Featherstone, ed., Cultural Theory and Cultural Change (London: Sage Publications, 1992); the new journal Theory, Culture & Society; Jeffrey C. Alexander and Steven Seidman, eds., Culture and Society. Contemporary Debates (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Richard A. Schweder, Thinking Through Cultures. Expeditions in Cultural Psychology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Richard A. Schweder and Robert A. LeVine, ed., Culture Theory. Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant. Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); idem, Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); and David Laitin, Politics, Language and Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) as well as idem, Language and States, Working Paper 3, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan

March de Estudios e Investigaciones, May 1990. For a useful paper examining the relationship between culture and politics, see Samuel H. Barnes, Politics and Culture (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Political Studies, The University of Michigan, 1988).

4. The more notable works on Greek political culture include Maro Pantelidou-Malouta, Politikes staseis kai antilepseis sten arche tes efeveias. Politike koinonikopoiese sto plaisio tes hellenikes politikes koultouras [Political Attitudes and Perceptions at the Onset of Adolescence. Political Socialization in the Context of Greek Political Culture] (Athens: Gutenberg, 1987); the more recent and more theoretical works by Nikos Demertzis, Cultural Theory and Political Culture (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1985) and Koultoura, neoterikoteta, politike koultoura [Culture, Modernity, and Political Culture] (Athens: Papazesses, 1989); George Th. Mavrogordatos, et al., "Syngritike erevna politikes koultouras stis chores tes Notias Evropes: eisagogikes paratereseis" [Comparative Research on Political Culture in the Countries of Southern Europe: Introductory Remarks], The Greek Review of Social Research 69A (Summer 1988), 5-24; and the special issue of The Greek Review of Social Research 75A (Summer 1990), entitled Politike Koultoura: Syngritika Stoicheia kai kritikes theoreseis [Political Culture: Comparative Data and Critical Perspectives]. Finally, for a historical approach to the study of Greek political culture, see P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends," in Richard Clogg, ed., Greece in the 1980s (London: Macmillan, 1983), 43-69.

5. This is, of course, not to argue, in a facile manner, that

all traces of the old order were eliminated. This is clearly not the case anytime, anywhere. Rather, it is meant to underscore the degree of transformation associated with industrialization and of the fact that, in societies that have experienced early rather than late industrialization, it is usually possible to point to the existence of an integrative culture whose dominance is not seriously and effectively contested by the presence of alternative and assertive rival cultures.

For Gerschenkron's analysis and formulation, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962). The congruence of state and civil society is implicitly one of the major themes running through the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) as well as of the recent important study by Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development & Democracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. On late industrialization and on the developmental problems associated with it, see Nicos P. Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America (London: Macmillan, 1986) and his earlier work, which is more directly focused on Greece, Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment (London: Macmillan, 1978).

6. On the concept of primordial sentiments as they affect state- and nation-building, see Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in idem, ed., Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 105-58. The reemergence of conflicts

involving to such sentiments in the territories of the former Soviet Union as well as of East Central and Southeastern Europe has injected a dimension of controversy into the concept itself. This is because, in the eyes of many analysts, primordiality appears to be equated with rigidly held cultural views and positions that are inimical to political negotiation and, hence, profoundly resistant to change through human engineering. I believe that such a rigid and hostile view of the concept is misplaced, precisely because it is extreme. My use of it here is meant to point to the fact that, in the circumstances of dissolution of authority, of established and widely accepted behavioral norms, and of widespread insecurity, moral sentments rooted in kinship ties or in narrowly and exclusively defined solidaristic arrangements can play an increasingly important in role the strategies, tactics, and practices pursued by individuals of groups, as they attempt to confront an unpredictable and hostile environment. As such, they ought to be taken seriously into consideration by analysts attempting to interpret the situations in which these occur. For a detailed examination of the negative articulation between state and society and its implications for political culture in Greece, see P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Greek Political Culture in Transition."

7. On the concept of "confining conditions," see Otto Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," American Political Science Review 59:4 (1965), 964-74. On the struggle between rival cultural traditions and politics in Spain, see Miguel Artola, La burguesia revolucionaria (1808-1874) (Madrid: Alianza Universidad, 1973; Miguel Martinez Cuadrado, La burguesia conservadora (1874-1931) (Madrid: Alianza

Universidad, 1973; the pertinent sections of the classic work by Raymond Carr, Spain 1808-1975 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) and the comparative study by Stanley G. Payne, History of Spain and Portugal (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973). On Portugal, see the work by Payne just mentioned and, especially, A.H. de Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal, 2d ed., 2 vols.,(New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). Finally, for Italy, see, especially, the dated but still valuable work by Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism: 1870-1925 (London: Methuen, 1967) and Denis Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1969).

8. On Ortega y Gasset, see his classic analysis of Spanish analysis and politics in the early twentieth century in Invertebrate Spain (New York, W.W.Norton, 1937). On Paparrhegopoulos, see, above all, Constantine Th. Dimaras, K. Paparrhegopoulos (Athens: Morfotiko Hidryma Ethnikes Trapezes, 1986), idem, ed., Konstantinos Paparrhegopoulos. Prolegomena [Constantine Paparrhe-gopoulos. The Prolegomena] (Athens: Hermes, 1970). A monograph which deals with the sense of malaise that gripped Greek society at the turn of the century is Gerassimos Augustinos, Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society 1897-1914 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1977).

9. This is not the place to cite the vast literature dealing with the dramatic changes which have transformed the Southern European societies and cultures in the past quarter century. For a historical overview of the process of change covering the whole region, see Edward E. Malefakis, "The Socioeconomic and

Historical Context," in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds., "The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective," unpublished ms., 1993, 62-117. For a recent discussion of culture and politics in contemporary Spain, see Richard Gunther, Culture and Politics in Spain (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Political Research, University of Michigan, 1988) and the revised, updated, but unpublished version of the same, entitled "Politics and Cultural Change in Spain." On Portugal, see Lawrence S. Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler, ed., In Search of Modern Portugal. The Revolution and its Consequences. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); Thomas C. Bruneau, Politics and Nationhood. Post- Revolutionary Portugal (New York: Praeger, 1984); and Kenneth Maxwell and Michael H. Haltzel, eds., Portugal. Ancient Country, Young Democracy (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center Press, 1990).

10. For the initial discussion of the concept of "critical juncture," see, Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 37-56 and, for the more extensive recent elaboration, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena. Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 27-39.

11. See Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 32 for their discussion of the duration of critical junctures. Concern with the importance of sequence is prominent in studies of political change. It is certainly pronounced in the current literature on democratization. For an early examination of this

issue, see Sidney Verba, "Sequences and Development," in Leonard Binder, et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 283-316.

12. On the late nature of Greek industrialization, see Nicos P. Mouzelis, Modern Greece, 3-29; on the importation of liberal, western political institutions in Greece and on the struggles surrounding it, see P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Political Modernization, Social Conflict, and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State, 1821- 1828" unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1972 and John A. Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968). See also Constantine Tsoucalas, "'Enlightened' Concepts in the 'Dark': Power and Freedom, Politics and Society" Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 9:1 (May 1991), 10-22 for a different but complementary perspective.

13. On the statist tradition in Greece, see, especially, Constantine Tsoucalas, Koinonike anaptyxe kai kratos. He syngrotese tou demosiou chorou sten Hellada [Social Development and the State. The Construction of the Public Sector in Greece] (Athens: Themelio, 1981) for the 19th century and George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic. Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983). For the concept of "sultanistic regimes," see Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), vol. 1, 231-32. For a more extensive discussion, see Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, ed., Handbook of Political

Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 175-411 and Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Eastern Europe, Southern Europe & South America, unpublished ms., 1993, 16-22.

14. For the quotation, see Amilkas S. Alivizatos, Ekklesia kai politeia ex epopseos orthodoxou [Church and State Viewed from an Orthodox Perspective] (Athens, 1937), 22. On Eastern Orthodoxy, in general, see John Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1965); Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1963). On the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its historic role within Eastern Orthodoxy, see Maximos, Metropolitan of Sardes, Le patriarcat oecumenique dans l'eglise orthodoxe: etude historique et canonique (Paris: Beauchesne, 1975); Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and Theodore H. Papadopoullos, Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination (Brussels, 1952). For the Patriarchate's ambivalent relationship with nationalism, see Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans" in Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis, ed., Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality (Athens: Sage-ELIAMEP, 1990), 23-66 and, for the case of Cyprus, idem, "The Dialectic of Intolerance: Ideological Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict," Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 6:4 (Winter 1979), 5-30. On the relations of Eastern Orthodoxy with the West, see Derek Baker, ed., The Orthodox Churches and the West (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976) and Philip Sherrard, The Greek

East and Latin West. A Study in the Christian Tradition (London: Oxford University Press, 1959). On Orthodox theology, see Vladimir Lessky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1989) and Panagiotes N. Trembelas, Dogmatique de l'Eglise orthodoxe catholique, 3 vols., (Paris: Editions de Chevetogne, Desclee De Brouwer, 1966-68). For the challenges and opportunities facing Eastern Orthodoxy and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the late 20th century, see Pedro Ramet, ed., Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century. Christianity Under Duress (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988) as well as the interview by Ioannes Zezioulas, a specialist in Dogmatics closely linked to the Patriarchate, in He Kathemerine [The Daily], 5 September 1993, 8 and, especially, his observation that the choices facing Orthodoxy today are "...either to constitute a political 'ghetto' isolating itself from its environment or to participate creatively in the historical process. If it chooses the first course, it will wither away and will end up as a sect which sooner or later will disappear...."

On the Greek Orthodox Church and its relations with the modern Greek state, see Charles Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece 1821-1852 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); idem, "Church and State in Greece," in John T.A.Koumoulides, ed., Greece in Transition. Essays in the History of Modern Greece 1821-1974 (London: Zeno, 1977); idem, "The Orthodox Church of Greece: The last Fifteen Years," Indiana Social Studies Quarterly, 32:1 (Spring 1979), 89-110; George D. Kent, "The Political Influence of the Orthodox Church in Greece," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1971; Kallistos Ware, "The Church: A Time of Transition," in Richard Clogg, ed., Greece in the 1980s (London: Macmillan, 1983), 208-

30; Theofanis Stavrou, "The Orthodox Church of Greece," in Pedro Ramet, ed., Eastern Christianity and Politics...; Vassiliki Georgiadou, Griechenlands nich-kapitalistische Entwicklungsaspekte im 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1991); Thanos Lipowatz, "Christianisme orthodoxe et nationalisme: deux composantes de la culture politique grecque moderne" unpublished ms., 1992; and Elizabeth H. Prodromou, "Democracy, Religion and Identity in Socialist Greece: Church-State Relations Under PASOK, 1981-1989," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993.

15. For a similar perspective on the importance of the notion of "contraction," see Thanos Veremis, "He epistrofe tou ethnikismou" [The Return of Nationalism], To Vema [The Tribune], 5 January 1992. On the continuing relevance of the notion of "contraction" for the older of the Greek cultural traditions as well as for Eastern Orthodoxy, see the article "Piesseis sto Patriarcheio Ierousalem" [Pressures on the Jerusalem Patriarchate] in He Kathemerine [The Daily], 11 December 1992, p. 2, which expresses concern over the mounting prospects for the gradual "arabization" of that Patriarchate and for the demise of the dominance traditionally exercised by the Greek clergy in that Church-- a dominance regarded by the Arab local populations as "...a remnant of Ottoman administration..."

16. Greece's relations with foreign powers have been the subject of a voluminous and uneven literature. For a balanced and valuable introduction to the subject, see Theodore A. Couloumbis, John A. Petropulos, and Harry J. Psomiades, Foreign Intervention in Greek Politics (New York: Pella, 1976); Theodore A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO

Influences (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); and Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides, eds., Greek-American Relations: A Critical Review (New York: Pella, 1980). For the concept of "conditional sovereignty," see Nicholas Kaltchas, Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece (New York: AMS Press, 1965). On Greek nationalism and the conflicts surrounding the gradual death of the Ottoman empire, see Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece 1771- 1923 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972); the special issue of the European History Quarterly 19 (1989), entitled Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality; the classic study by Leften Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Wilson, 1958); and the more recent work by Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1977).

17. On the structure and politics in the Ottoman empire, see, Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (New York: Praeger, 1973); H.A.R.Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East, vol 1, parts 1 and 2, (London: Oxford University Press, 1950,1957); and Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). For the conditions of pervasive social disruption which prevailed in the Balkans and Greece during the age of Ottoman decline, see Stavrianos, The Balkans..., 117-153 and Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft..., 3-52.

Political science treatments of the relationship between clientelism and politics in Greece include Keith R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford: Stanford University Press,

1969); Constantine Tsoucalas, "On the Problem of Political Clientelism in Greece in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 5:2 (Spring 1978), 5-17 and, more recently, Christos Lyrintzis, "Politike kai pelateiako systema sten Hellada tou 19ou aiona" [Politics and Clientelism in 19th Century Greece] Epeteris tou Kentrou Erevnon tes Hellenikes Koinonias [Annual of the Research Center on Greek Society] (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1987), 157-82; idem, To telos ton "tzakion." Koinonia kai politike sten Achaia tou 19ou aiona [The End of the Notables. Society and Politics in 19th Century Achaia] (Athens: Themelio, 1991); and Demetres Charalambes, Pelateiakes scheseis kai laikismos. He exothesmike synainese sto helleniko politiko systema [Clientelism and Populism. The Extrainstitutional Consensus in the Greek Political System] (Athens: Exantas, 1989). For anthropological studies of the same topic, see, especially, John K. Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage. A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Village (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); Michael Herzfeld, The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); and idem, A Place in History. Social and Monumental Time in a Cretan Mountain Village (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). On this cultural tradition’s conception of civil rights, see Adamantia Pollis, "The State, The Law and Human Rights in Modern Greece," Human Rights Quarterly, 9 (1987), 584-86 and 596-612; and idem, "Greek National Identity: Religious Minorities, Rights, and European Norms," Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 10 (1992), 171-95.

18. A direct byproduct of this culture’s defensive view of the world is the importance it accords to "rights," be they national,

corporate, or individual which change is seen perennially to threaten. The invocation of rights is salient in both the foreign and the domestic field. In the former, enemies or adversaries are seen as constantly threatening "just" Greek positions or "rights." In the latter case, entitlements threatened by new policies are defended in the same way as "sacred rights." In this sense, "rights" are invested with a lasting, unchanging, and morally superior content which elevates them above the morally ambivalent and messy fray of politics and the world of compromise that this implies. In that sense also, "rights" thus conceived constitute the polar opposite of "interests," understood as the "natural" calculus for human action in modern societies and as expressions of the logic of give and take, of compromise, and of the market, which define politics and economics in the modern world.

For a thorough and ground-breaking study linking particular social strata to each of the rival Greek cultural traditions during the interwar period, see George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic; for complementary treatments of the same topic covering different periods of Greek history, see Constantine Tsoucalas, Koinonike Anaptyxe kai kratos [Social Development and the State] for the 19th century and the more recent work Kratos, koinonia, ergasia ste metapolemike Hellada [State, Society, Labor in Postwar Greece] (Athens: Themelio, 1987).

Use of the term "underdog" poses an intriguing problem. Though aptly capturing the meaning and defining properties of a particular cultural tradition, it fails to provide adequate indication of its theoretical content and its broader potential utility. My inclination is to view this notion as fitting rather nicely in a developmental variant of the well-known five pairs of

pattern variables distinguishing traditional from modern societies elaborated by Talcott Parsons in his General Theory of Action. Viewed this way, an "underdog" culture can be conceived as a subcategory of "traditional" that can be applied to societies or cultures which have experienced contact with more "developed" systems, have established asymmetrical, subordinate relations with them, and have internalized this asymmetry in negative and defensive terms that have translated in a commensurately diffident and xenophobic view of the international order. For a similar assessment, see Andones Makrydemetres, "Syllogikes diekdikeseis kai dioiketikes metarrythmiseis: opseis tes hellenikes dioiketikes koultouras" [Collective Demands and Administrative Reforms: Aspects of Greek Administrative Culture], unpublished ms., 1992, 17-18. For Parsons' pattern variables, see Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Towards a General Theory of Action. Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 76-95.

19. The difficulties posed by attempts at periodization are well known. This is especially the case, when it comes to defining "internal-substantive" criteria for determining the end of a period, the beginning of another, and the inevitable phase of overlap and transition, as well as for identifying what constitutes a sufficiently important event to warrant the label of "a break." Without entering into a substantive discussion on this matter, I would say that the underdog culture can be said to have been ascendant in Greek politics from the 1830s to the early 1880s and from the mid- 1930s to the mid-1970s. The periods between the mid-1890s to 1909 and the mid-1970s to the present can be said to represent moments of transition, which paved the way for the renewed ascendancy of the rival, reformist culture.

For an analysis of contemporary Greek society, which focuses on its "defensive" qualities, see Ilias Katsoulis, "To ‘anthropino kefalaio’ ste diadikasia eksynchronismou. He hellenike ‘amyntike koinonia’ brosta sten proklese tou 2000" ["Human Capital" in the Modernization Process. The Greek "Defensive Society" Facing the Challenge of the Year 2000] in Ilias Katsoulis, Tassos Giannitses, and Panos Kazakos, eds., He Hellada pros to 2000: Politike, oikonomia kai exoterikes scheseis [Greece Towards the Year 2000. Politics, Economics, and Foreign Relations] (Athens: Papazesses, 1988), 35-47.

The major socioeconomic change which has unevenly transformed Greece during the last four decades has been the subject of many scholarly articles by economists but few by other social scientists. Monographic syntheses have, so far, been rare. In addition to the works by Mouzelis, already cited, see P.C. Ioakimidis, "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism," in Allan Williams, ed., Southern Europe Transformed. Political and Economic Change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 33-60 and the more general, comparative work by Edward E. Malefakis, Southern Europe in the 19th & 20th Centuries: An Historical Overview (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 1992). For a monographic study by a historian, see William H. McNeill, The Metamorphosis of Greece Since World War II (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) and by an economist Andreas F. Freris, The Greek Economy in the Twentieth Century (Kent: Croom Helm, 1988).

20. On the intellectual roots of the reformist tradition in the Enlightenment and in western liberalism, see, especially, Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "Tradition, Enlightenment and

Revolution: Ideological Change in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Greece," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1978 and idem, The Enlightenment as Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the 18th Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). See also Constantine Th. Dimaras, La Grece au temps des lumieres (Geneva: Droz, 1969) and idem, Neohellenikos diafotismos [Modern Greek Enlightenment] (Athens: Hermes, 1977). On the reformist tradition, see, among others, Diamandouros, "Political Modernization," Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, and Katerina Gardikas, Partisan Politics in Greece, 1875-1885: Towards a Two-Party System," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, King's College, University of London, 1988.

21. On the significance of the diaspora for modern Greek development and, indirectly, for its impact on the reformist culture, see, among others, Constantine Tsoucalas, "Dependance et reproduction. Le role des appareils scolaires en Grece," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Paris I, 1975; George Dertilis, "Social Change and Military Intervention in Politics: Greece 1881-1928," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Sheffield, 1976; Harilaos Exertzoglou, "Greek Banking in Constantinople 1850- 1881," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, King's College, University of London, 1986; idem, Homogeneiakes epicheirematikes praktikes sten Othomanike Aftokratoria. To Emborio [Greek Entre-preneurial Practices in the Ottoman Empire. Commerce] (Athens: Morfotiko Hidryma Ethnikes Trapezes, forthcoming); and Ioannes K. Chassiotes, Episkopese tes historias tes neohellenikes diasporas [Overview of the History of the Modern Greek Diaspora] (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 1993).

22. On the conceptual distinction between "modernization" and "development," see Nicos P. Mouzelis, Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Political Modernization and Political Clientelism in Nineteenth Century Greece" unpublished ms. The relation between culture and politics is not systematically treated in contemporary analyses of modern Greek politics and society. For the interwar period, George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, 182-296 contains valuable analyses focusing on specific aspects of this relationship. For a more recent period, see the essay by Constantine Tsoucalas, "The Ideological Impact of the Civil War," in John O. Iatrides, ed., Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis (Hanover, NH: University of New England Press, 1981), 319- 41.

23. On the 1974 Greek transition to democratic politics, see Harry J. Psomiades, "Greece: From the Colonels' Rule to Democracy," in John H. Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy. Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 251- 73; Susannah Verney and Theodore Couloumbis, "State-International Systems Interaction and the Greek Transition to Democracy in the mid-1970s," in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Encouraging Democracy. The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1991; Constantine Arvanitopoulos, "The Political Economy of Regime Transition: The Case of Greece," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1989; P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Transition to, and Consolidation of, Democratic Politics in Greece, 1974-83: A Tentative Assessment," in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., The New

Mediterranean Democracies. Regime Transitions in Spain, Greece and Portugal (London: Frank Cass, 1984), 50-71; and idem, "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, ed., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 138-65.

24. On the construction and dynamics of the exclusivist state in post-civil war Greece, see, among others, Nicos P. Mouzelis, "Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece," in idem, Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, 115- 133; Constantine Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969); Nicos C. Alivizatos, Les institutions politiques de la Grece a travers les crises 1922-1974 (Paris: LGDJ, 1979), 95-206 and 351-478; Jean Meynaud, Les forces politiques en Grece (Lausanne: Etudes de Science Politique, 1965); and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Regime Change...," in Schmitter et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. For an initial discussion of the circumstances under which these marginalized strata were incorporated in the post-1974 political system, see P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "PASOK and State-Society Relations in Post-Authoritarian Greece (1974-1988)," in Speros Vryonis, Jr., ed., Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK 1974-1986 (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Publishers, 1991, 15-35.

25. Authoritative analyses of Greek foreign policy in the postauthoritarian period, which cover perspectives reflecting the views of the two rival cultures, include Dimitri C. Konstas, "Greek Foreign Policy Objectives, 1974- 1986," in Yearbook 1988 (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy,

[1989]), 93-128; Van Coufoudakis, "Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-1985: Seeking Independence in an Interdependent World--Problems and Prospects," in Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas, Political Change in Greece Before and After the Colonels (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 230-52; Theodore A. Couloumbis, "The Structures of Greek Foreign Policy," in Richard Clogg, ed., Greece in the 1980s, 95-121; idem, "Defining Greek Foreign Policy Objectives," in Howard R. Penniman, Greece at the Polls. The National Elections of 1974 and 1977 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 160-84; Christos Rozakis, "La politique etrangere grecque 1974-1985: modernisation et role international d'un petit pays," in Les Temps Modernes 473 (December 1985), 861-87; Heinz Jurgen Axt, Aussenpolitik Griechenlands: Grundzuge und Bestimmungs-faktoren nach dem Ende der Militarjunta (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1991); and Yannis Kapsis, Strategе mou, idou he fregata sas. Ta ethnika mas symferonta thesia ste nea taxe pragmaton tou proedrou Bous [My General, Behold Your Frigate. Our National Interests Sacrificed to President Bush's New Order] (Athens: Nea Synora, 1991).

26. There can be no doubt that the widespread legitimacy with which the new political system was quickly invested was due, in great part, to the acceptance which both cultures extended to it. This being the case, the question which then arises is: given the historically conflictual relationship characteristic of the two cultures, what accounts for this convergence of attitudes on this issue? To begin with, the new system pragmatically benefited the adherents of both cultures in qualitatively important but different ways. For the reformist culture, the new system represented the realization of long-held normative goals

such as the equality of all citizens and the rule of law in the context of political democracy. For the underdog culture, on the other hand, the advent of political democracy had a dual instrumental value. First, it signaled the end of a system of political discrimination that had been primarily directed against its adherents. For this reason alone, the new state of affairs was both welcome and very much worth supporting. Second, however, it also held out the prospect for a potential redress of past wrongs and sufferings, real of perceived. This "compensatory" feature of the new system and the expectations that it raised among strata loyal to the underdog culture greatly added to its instrumental legitimation in the eyes of these strata.

Three important implications arise from such an analysis: first, that, for different reasons each, the two cultures held positive and supportive views of the new system at the crucial regime level and that it was this felicitous convergence of views which lent the 1974-1985 period its powerful incorporative dynamic and greatly contributed to the consolidation of democracy in Greece, within a short period of time. Second, that this convergence on the critical issue of regime legitimation served to obscure the sharply divergent perspectives of the two cultures on issues which, relative to regime consolidation, could justifiably be regarded as less pressing (e.g., socioeconomic policies, the ends of the democratic system, etc). Third, that, seen in this light, the incorporative moment can be "read" in significantly different ways through each culture's system of meanings: as a triumphant but unexpectedly brief moment in the evolving history of the underdog culture, which was abruptly interrupted in 1985; and as the auspicious beginning of a renewed momentum which would create the possibility for yet another

period of ascendancy for the social and political forces identified with the reformist culture.

27. The literature concerning PASOK and its impact on Greek politics and society is quite extensive. Published systematic treatments of the subject include Michalis Spourdalakis, The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party (London: Routledge, 1988); Ioannis Papadopoulos, Dynamique du discours politique et conquete du pouvoir. Le cas du PASOK (Mouvement socialiste panhellenique): 1974-1981 (Berne: Peter Lang, 1989); Zafiris Tzannatos, ed., Socialism in Greece (London: Gower, 1986); Heinz-Jurgen Axt, Die PASOK. Aufstieg und Wandel des verspateten Sozialismus in Griechenland (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1985); Speros Vryonis, Jr., ed., Greece on the Road to Democracy, already cited; Nikolaos A. Stavrou, ed., Greece Under Socialism. A NATO Ally Adrift (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Press, 1988); and Theodore C. Kariotis, ed., The Greek Socialist Experiment. Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989 (New York: Pella Press, 1992).

The major unpublished works on the subject include Lyrintzis, "Between Socialism and Populism: The Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1983; Dimitrios A. Sotiropoulos, "State and Party: The Greek State Bureaucracy and The Penhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), 1981-1989," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1991; Paraskevy D. Kaler- Christofilopoulou, "Decentralization in Post-Dictatorial Greece," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1989; and the polemical study by Spyros Kostas Philippas, "The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK): Ideology and Politics," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The George Washington University, 1986.

Among the many, mostly uneven works, in Greek, focusing on various aspects of this subject, the Greek edition of Spourdalakis's work cited above, as well as Angelos Elefandis, Ston asterismo tou laikismou [In the Constellation of Populism] (Athens: Polites, 1991); and Stelios Koulouglou, Sta ichne tou tritou dromou [Following the Traces of the Third Way] (Athens: Odysseas, 1986) stand out. See also the more specialized work by George Th. Mavrogordatos, The Rise of the Green Sun. The Greek Election of 1981 (London: Centre for Contemporary Greek Studies, King's College, 1983).

28. On the ways in which the constitutional revision of 1975 addresses central concerns of the reformist culture, see Aristovoulos Manessis, "L'evolution des institutions politiques de la Grece: a la recherche d'une legitimite difficile," in Les Temps Modernes 473 (December 1985), 772- 814; Nicos C. Alivizatos, Les institutions politiques de la Grece, 549-52; and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Politics and Constitutionalism in Greece: The 1975 Constitution in Historical Perspective," in Houchang E. Chehabi and Alfred Stepan, eds., Politics, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Studies. Essays in Honor of Juan J. Linz, volume III (Boulder, CO: Westview, forthcoming).

On the debate concerning the European Community and its potential impact on Greek politics, economy, and society, see Susannah Verney, "To be or not to be Within the European Community: The Party Debate and Democratic Consolidation in Greece," in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe (London: Routledge, 1990), 203-23. This article is especially valuable for understanding how the issue of the Community was confronted and internalized by forces adhering to the two rival cultures.

See also idem, "Greece and the European Community," in Featherstone, ed., Political Change in Greece, 253-70; M. Pateras, "From Association to Accession: Changing Attitudes of Greek Political Parties Towards Greek Relations with the European Communities, 1957- 1975," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1984; Verney and Couloumbis, "State-international Systems...", cited above; Hellada kai EOK: Ho Antilogos [Greece and the EEC: The Counterargument], 4th ed., (Athens: PASOK, 1978); Kostas Simitis, He domike antipoletefse [Structural Opposition] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 1979); Kostas Hadjiargyres, He entaxe sten EOK kai he these tes Helladas [Accession to the EEC and the Position of Greece] (Athens: Synchrone Epoche, 1979); Gia ena helleniko dromo pros te demokratike anagennese kai to sosialismo [For a Greek Road to Democratic Renaissance and Socialism] (Athens: KKE-Esoterikou, 1976).

29. PASOK's first quadrennium in power produced a plethora of measures, many of which sought to promote projects and arrangements that were distinctly populist in nature and were informed by a defensive logic. Salient examples of these include legislation which eliminated the top echelons (directors general and directors) of the state bureaucracy in order to reduce the distance between the top and bottom of the hierarchy and to provide for a more "egalitarian" structure in the civil service; the establishment of a uniform, broader, and equalizing grade and salary scales for civil servants; and the institution of a computerized system of hiring new personnel, which guaranteed equal treatment for candidates but introduced criteria of selection which strongly devalued the weight assigned to meritocratic criteria.

Populism has been the subject of a number of analyses in recent years. To date, however, systematic treatments of this phenomenon have focused almost exclusively on PASOK. While this is rather natural, given the success with which this particular party used this powerful ideological instrument of social and political mobilization, it has obscured the fact that, with significant variations in intensity and breadth, populism cuts across the entire spectrum of political parties in contemporary Greece. The most cogent analyses of the phenomenon are to be found in the unpublished dissertation by Lyrintzis, "Between Socialism and Populism..."; the same author's "The Power of Populism: The Greek Case," European Journal of Political Research, 15:6 (1987), 667-86 and idem, "PASOK in Power: The Loss of the Third Road to Socialism," in Tom Gallagher and Allan Williams, ed., Southern European Socialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 34-58; Angelos Elefandis, "PASOK and the Elections of 1977: Rise of the Populist Movement," in Howard R. Penniman, ed., Greece at the Polls, 105-29; idem, Ston asterismo tou laikismou [In the Constellation of Populism]; Dimitris Charalambis, Pelateiakes scheseis kai laikismos; and Nicos Mouzelis, Thanos Lipovats, and Michalis Spourdalakis, Laikismos kai politike [Populism and Politics] (Athens: Gnosis, 1989). See, finally Michalis Spourdalakis, "PASOK in the 1990s: Structure, Ideology, Political Strategy," in Jose Maria Maravall, et al., Socialist Parties in Europe (Barcelona: Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials, 1991), 157-86 for a specific discussion of currents within PASOK which coincide with the distinction between the two rival cultures developed in this paper.

30. For articulate and sophisticated positions expressing the

concerns of the reformist culture in the various parties, see, for PASOK, Kostas Simitis, Anaptyxe kai eksychronismos tes hellenikes koinonias [Development and Modernization of Greek Society] (Athens: Gnosse, 1989) and, more recently, idem, Protaseis gia mia alle politike [Proposals for Another Policy] (Athens: Gnosse, 1992); for New Democracy, J.C.Loulis, "New Democracy: The New Face of Conservatism," in Howard R. Penniman, ed., Greece at the Polls, 49-83, and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas, "New Democracy: In or Out of Social Democracy?" in Speros Vryonis, Jr., ed., Greece on the Road to Democracy, 1-14; and, for the eurocommunist Left (KKE-Esoterikou), Gia ena helleniko dromo...[For a Greek Road...], cited above.

Similar questions have been also addressed in a different and relatively recent literature whose major purpose is to explore basic aspects of modern Greek society and culture through literary analysis and criticism. For representative examples, see Vassilis Lambropoulos, Literature as National Institution: Studies in the Politics of Greek Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Dimitris Tziovas, He metamorfose tou ethnismou kai to ideologema tes hellenikotetas sto mesopolemo [The Transformation of Nationism and the Ideological Construct of Hellenicity in the Interwar Period] (Athens: Odisseas, 1989); and Gregory Jusdanis, Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture. Inventing National Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).

31. For a discussion of the sources reflecting the different ways in which the prospect of accession to the Community was internalized and negotiated by the two rival cultures, see Susannah Verney, "To be or not to be Within the European Community..." and, more generally, n. 22 above. Though not fully

articulated at the time, security considerations apparently figured prominently in the rationale underlying the Greek application for membership to the Community. On this, see Yannis Valinakis, "La strategie de la Grece en vue de l'adhesion a la CEE," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Paris I, 1981.

32. General treatments, in English, dealing with the political economy of Greek membership in the Community as well as with more narrowly economic aspects of the same subject include Loukas Tsoukalis, Greece and the European Community (Westmead, England: Saxon House, 1979); idem, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981; and George Yannopoulos, ed., Greece and the EEC (Reading: University of Reading, 1986). See also the extensive bibliographical essay by Michael Tsinisizelis, "Greece and the European Community: A Bibliographical Essay," Modern Greek Society: A Social Science Newsletter 17:1 (December 1989), 2-122. For a recent, candid discussion of the same issues, in Greek, see Loukas Tsoukalis, ed., He Hellada sten Evropaike Koinoteta: He proklese tes prosarmoges [Greece in the European Community: The Challenge of Adjustment] (Athens: Papazesses, 1993).

33. Within the Greek socialist movement, the views expressing the concerns of the underdog culture with respect to the European Community were, in their more extreme, militant but ultimately defensive form, articulated by the newspaper Avriani. A more sophisticated presentation of similar concerns can be found in the writings of, among others, Soteres Kostopoulos, Michalis Charalambides, both prominent members of PASOK, and,

occasionally, in the party organ Exormese. Closely associated with the same camp was the television station Channel 29 which broadcast a particularly virulent populist discourse. A most articulate and powerful voice of the underdog culture which consciously sought to attract audiences from across the political spectrum was radio station "SKY-FM."

34. On the internal contradictions of the broad social coalition supporting the underdog culture during this period, see, especially, Tsoucalas, Kratos, koinonia, ergasia [State, Society, Labor], 53-287; Andreas Pantazopoulos, "He koinonike synthese tou stelechikou dynamikou tou PASOK (1974-1981)" [The Social Composition of PASOK's Cadres (1974-1981)] Ho Polites [The Citizen], 83 (25 September 1987), 14-25, which contains important observations concerning the internal social differentiation of these party cadres; and Elefandis, Ston asterismo tou laikismou [In the Constellation of Populism].

35. On the particularist logic which governed the distribution of these resources and which, by definition, precluded the promotion of reform and, instead, steered available resources to thousands of small unproductive, but vote-getting, investments, see, Demetres A. Sotiropoulos, "Kratike grafeiokratia kai laikistiko komma: he periptose tou PASOK, 1981-1989" [State Bureaucracy and Populist Party: The Case of PASOK, 1981-1989], Synchrona Themata [Contemporary Matters], 49 (May 1993), 13-24.

36. During the period under discussion, the dynamics of the underdog culture's relationship with politics were primarily made manifest through PASOK, then in power, and, to a lesser extent, the Communist Party of Greece which strongly supported the first

nonconservative party to come to power in Greece in 45 years. This development led many observers erroneously to identify the underdog culture with these two parties and, even more egregiously, misguidedly to link New Democracy with the modernizing culture. Such a perspective failed to appreciate the extent to which the two cultures effectively cut across the political parties--a reality which was to become abundantly clear, once New Democracy came to power in 1990. On this point, see below, 74-75.

The concept of "compensatory justice" appropriately highlights the point just raised: for, while, during the period under consideration, this concept, as a device for the dispensation of patronage, was especially evident in the policies of PASOK and the party structures specifically established for that purpose and aptly named "solidarity bureaus" ("grafeia allelengyes"), exactly the same phenomenon was subsequently to appear when New Democracy came to power and set up its own version of solidarity structures. Indications exist that a similar practice appears to have been followed by the Coalition for the Left and Progress (Synaspismos tes Aristeras kai tes Proodou) during the period of its participation in the coalition governments of 1989-90. (I wish to thank my colleague, Michalis Spourdalakis, for the information concerning this last point.)

Specific measures exemplifying the logic of compensatory justice include legislation providing for a special point system designed to favor the entry of socially disadvantaged individuals into the public sector (law 1320/1983) or for granting civil service tenure to a large numbers of temporary workers (law 1476/1984). The former law was abandoned in 1987, following widespread reaction against the abusively partial way in which it had been applied to favor individuals identified with

"progressive" (mostly PASOK) parties.

The problems of governance arising out of the tensions inherent in the social coalition of forces supporting PASOK and the KKE are, among others, dealt with in the article by Christos Lyrintzis "From Change to Disenchantment," in Richard Clogg, ed., Greece 1981-1989: The Populist Decade (London: Macmillan, 1993) as well as in the various contributions contained in Speros Vryonis, Jr., ed., Greece on the Road to Democracy, 1-35 and 169-272.

37. On the way in which the major shared assumptions of the underdog culture influenced the conduct of foreign policy during the first four years of PASOK's rule, see n. 20 above and, more generally, the contributions in Speros Vryonis, Jr., Greece on the Road to Democracy, 37-168 and Nikolaos A. Stavrou, Greece Under Socialism, 251-403.

38. The struggle for the defense of entitlements was to acquire greater intensity with the passage of time. It was especially evident among the privileged, white collar trade unions in the wider public sector, especially in the various utilities and, to a lesser extent, the banking sector. For Simitis's views concerning the problems arising out of the defense of entitlements or what the Greeks call "syntechniake nootropia" [guild-type mentality], see his Anaptyxe kai eksychronismos [Development and Modernization], 71-88.

The depletion of material and symbolic capital referred to above was not a distinctive feature of PASOK's administrations. It continued unabated in the early 1990s, when New Democracy was in power. During this latter time, the depletion of good will was especially noticeable in the field of foreign affairs where,

in less than three years, the government's conduct of foreign policy with an eye to the domestic scene resulted in a major loss of credibility among its partners and allies and served to reinvigorate the sense of isolation and defensive nationalism that are salient features of the underdog culture. This was especially the case with the handling of the Balkan crisis which severely strained the country's relations with the European Community and its member states, the United States, and most of its Balkan neighbors. For a sampling of views on this subject expressed in the course of 1993 in non-Greek publications, see Wolfgang Koydl, "Gehort Griechenland zu Europa?", Suddeutsche Zeitung, 8 July 1993, 4 and Athanassios Ch. Papandropoulos, "Apovole tes Helladas apo ten EOK;" [The Expulsion of Greece from the EC?], Oikonomikos Tachydromos [Financial Courier], 12 August 1993. 5-6 and 87.

39. During the administration of New Democracy (1990-), the cultural climate of indeterminacy was further accentuated. The imposition, after much hesitation and strong EC prodding of an austerity program designed to cut down the country's enormous public deficit, to enhance restructuring, to reduce the size of the public sector, to promote privatization, and to make it possible for Greece to follow its partners on the long road to the European Union envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty unleashed a major wave of industrial actions by powerful labor unions ensconced in the wider public sector (e.g., Public Bus Transport; Public Power Corporation; Greek Telecommunications Organization) and strongly opposed to the loss of power which these changes inevitably implied.

40. For a recent report which discusses the negative long- term

implications of these practices, see "Greek horror story" Foreign Report (The Economist), 2266, 5 August 1993, 1-2. For a refreshingly frank and critical assessment of "nonconstructive" Greek attitudes towards the Community fostered by adherence to precepts of the underdog culture and of the extent to which these tended to undermine Greek credibility in EC circles, see Loukas Tsoukalis, ed., He Hellada sten Evropaike Koinoteta...[Greece in the European Community...].

41. Typical of the climate affecting Greece's relations with the Community in the late 1980s was the so-called "Yugoslav corn" scandal in which a state company and high- ranking government officials were directly implicated in doctoring a ship's papers in order falsely to make it appear that a shipment of Yugoslav corn was ostensibly Greek and, thus, to avoid paying a substantial sum to the Community in the form of import duties. In the trial which ensued, the main line of defense adopted by the former government minister involved in the scandal was to admit complicity in falsifying official documents but to argue that what underlay the attempt to deceive the EC authorities was not narrow private motive but "the national interest." The same argument was espoused by thirteen former ministers who served as witnesses for the defense. In this context, the chief Greek witnesses for the prosecution were reviled in the opposition press and radio as traitors to the nation, while, in a memorably extreme xenophobic utterance meant to justify the deception, the defense reminded the court that "when we [the Greeks] were building Parthenons, they [the West-and by implication the Community] were eating acorns."

42. Particularly good sources concerning the evolving relations

with the Community under conditions of mounting economic difficulties which led to the adoption of an austerity program and multiplied calls for the need to save, restructure, and reform are Panos Kasakos, "Die integrationspolitischen Initiativen der 80er Jahre und die griechische Europe-Politik," Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen, 31:2 (1991), 94-114; idem, He Hellada anamesa se prosarmoge kai perithoriopoiese. Dokimia evropaikes kai oikonomikes politikes [Greece Between Adjustment and Marginalization. Essays on European and Economic Policy] (Athens: Diatton, 1991); idem, ed., 1992: He exelixe tes esoterikes agoras sten Evrope kai he Hellada [1992: The Evolution of the Internal Market in Europe and Greece] (Athens: Ionian Bank, 1989); and Achilleas Mitsos, He hellenike viomechania ste diethne agora [Greek Industry in the International Market] (Athens: Themelio, 1989), 485-524. Indicative of the hardened attitude of the Community concerning the need for Greece strictly to abide by the terms of its agreements is the fact that the Greek government had not, as late as mid- 1993, applied for release of the second installment of the $2.2 billion loan because it could not report sufficient progress in meeting the conditions specified in the loan.

43. The most concrete evidence of in this direction is the growing collaboration between the Greek Federation of Industries (SEB) and the current, reform leadership of the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) which resulted in the decision to sign a historic two-year collective bargaining agreement in 1990. Specific provisions of this agreement, especially those providing for a sharply decreased state role in the administration of trade union funds, constitute especially notable indicators of an emerging trend away from traditional

state control of the trade union movement. Though covering only one year, the agreement signed in 1993 was also notable for its moderation, a quality best exemplified by the willingness of the GSEE to agree to wage increases which were considerably below current inflation levels, on the grounds that "this is the best that can be expected at this moment [of austerity and recession]." More generally, the increasing calls of large employers' organizations (super markets, department stores, private banks, large private industrial concerns, etc.) for the liberalization of the labor market and for the removal of archaic regulations designed to protect traditional and mostly-unproductive operations provide additional evidence of a discernible move in the same direction. Despite its often polemical dimensions, by far the best work, to date, dealing with evolving trends in Greek interest groups during the 1980s is George Th. Mavrogordatos, Metaxy Pityokampte kai Prokrouste: Hoi epangelmatikes organoseis ste semerine Hellada [Between Pityokamptes and Prokroustes: Employers' Organizations in Contemporary Greece] (Athens: Odysseas, 1988); see also the special issue of the respected weekly Oikonomikos Tachydromos [Financial Courier], 31 October 1991, 43-201. On the Greek trade union movement, see Theodore Katsanevas, "Trade Unions in Greece: An Analysis of Factors Determining their Growth and Present Structures," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1980; Rossetos Fakiolas, "Interest Groups: An Overview," in Featherstone and Katsoudas, ed., Political Change in Greece, 174-88; and the earlier study by Christos Jecchinis, Greek Trade Unionism: A Study in Political Paternalism (Chicago: Roosevelt University, 1967).

On the urgent need for reform, more generally, see Ilias

Katsoulis, Anastassios Giannitsis, and Panos Kasakos, ed., He Hellada pros to 2000; for economics and education, the pertinent sections in Kasakos, ed., 1992: He exelixe tes esoterikes Agoras kai he Hellada [1992: The Evolution of the Internal market and Greece]; and, for public administration, Dimitrios A. Sotiropoulos, "State and Party..."; Theodore Tsekos, "Changement politique et changement administratif: la haute fonction publique en Grece avant et apres 1981," in Danielle Lochak, ed., La Haute Administration et la Politique (Paris: C.U.R.A.P.P.-Presses Universitaires de France, 1986); and Kalliope Spanou, "Ekloges kai demosia dioikese: He eklogike energopoiese ton endodioiketikon pelateiakon mechanismon" [Elections and Public Administration: The Electoral Activation of Intra-administrative Patronage Mechanisms] in Chrestos Lyrintzis and Ilias Nicolacopoulos, ed., Ekloges kai kommata ste dekaetia tou ’80. Exelixeis kai prooptikes tou politikou systematos [Elections and Parties in the Decade of the ’80s. Evolution and Prospects of the Political System] (Athens: Themelio, 1990), 165-99.

44. The central role played by organizations associated with the state and the wider-public sector in the promotion of this climate of guild-type mentality should be stressed. The most vociferous opposition to structural change in recent years has emanated from (mostly well-funded, and powerful) trade union organizations associated with the overstaffed state sector which has traditionally been used as a mechanism for satisfying particularistic demands and for containing unemployment. For a short but incisive analysis which, in significant ways, parallels the argument developed in this paper, see Panages Vourloumis, "Giati apotynchanei he idiotikopoiese [Why

Privatization is Failing], Epikentra [Epicenters] 67 (September 1991), 28-30. Finally, a recent study which systematically analyzes the problems and prospects of small-scale industry in Greece within the overall context of the need for restructuring is Antigone Lyberaki, "Small Firms and Flexible Specialisation in Greek Industry," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Sussex, 1988.

45. While firm size constitutes an important element in this analysis, it is a relative and not am absolute criterion which needs to be combined with capitalization and modern management to become qualitatively important. The emergence of middle size, dynamic firms which combine these three elements and are quite successful in carving out a niche for themselves in the new, more competitive market confirms this observation. It also points to the importance of franchising and subcontracting as strategies for survival and growth for such firms--a feature of the evolving Greek scene which I address immediately below. Conversely, the validity of the same point is borne out by the low competitiveness characteristic of very large, undercapitalized firms or banks, lacking in modern management practices and mostly associated with, or controlled by, the grossly inefficient public sector.

46. For studies dealing with the phenomenon of structural dualism in selected areas of economic activity, see, among others, ICAP, Kladike melete: typopoiemena artoskevasmata [Sectoral Study: Standardized Bread Products] (Athens: ICAP, September 1992); Kladike melete: krassia-byra, oinopnevmatode [Sectoral Study: Wine-Beer, Alcoholic Beverages] (Athens: ICAP, October 1991); Kladike melete: etoima endymata [Sectoral

Study: Ready-to-Wear Apparel] (Athens: ICAP, May 1992); Kladike melete: ypodematopoiia [Sectoral Study: The Shoe Industry] (Athens: ICAP, February 1992); Spyros Vliamos, "Melete metengatastases tes ypodematoviomechanias tou nomou Attikes" [A Study Concerning the Relocation of the Footwear Industry of the Prefecture of Attica], unpublished ms., 1993. For accounts and analyses of the same phenomenon in the daily or weekly press, see the three-part report by Stefanos Tzanakes and Thanasses Lyrtsogiannes, "Chanontai ta mikra magazia" [The Small Shops Are Being Lost], Ta Nea [The News], 21-23 December 1992 and 11 January 1993, pp. 16-17, 24, 20, and 22 respectively. For the conflict between the super market chains and small grocers, butcher stores, bakeries, and even kiosks, see Demetres Charontakes and Gerassimos Zotos, "Sta sagonia ton...soupermarket" [In the Jaws of the Super Markets], To Vema [The Tribune], 23 May 1993, Section D, 22-23; for measures being taken by small- and medium-size firms to face competition, see Demetres Charontakes "He antepithese ton mikromesaion" [The Counterattack of the Small- and Medium- Size Firms], To Vema [The Tribune], 27 June 1993, Section D, 15. The Greek banking sector, which is almost 90% state controlled, represents a good example of large firms resisting change and competition being promoted by smaller but efficient private competitors. For an interesting account, see the special report by Stathes Chaikales concerning the battle over automation in the banking sector in To Vema [The Tribune], 28 February 1993, Section D, 21- 24.

47. For reports in the Greek press concerning bankruptcies in the garment sector, see K. Tsaousses, "Hoi protathletes ton ptochefseon" [The Champions of Bankruptcy], To Vema [The Tribune], 27 September 1992, Section D, 11. The mobilization of

the strata whose traditional way of life is being threatened by these developments takes a variety of forms, including pressure upon the government by chambers of commerce and professional associations to maintain intact administrative mechanisms of market regulation; marches; public utterances; and, in extremis, strikes. A good case in point was the proposal, in 1992, to change the system governing the times during which commercial stores would be open during the working week. The proposal, strongly supported by super markets and large, competitive firms, would have abandoned the traditional "split" system of morning and afternoon working hours in a favor of a continuous schedule. Though "rational" from a number of perspectives and arguably beneficial for, among others, the environment and traffic, the proposal was fiercely resisted by the small owners who dominate the professional associations and chambers of commerce because it would have, in most cases, required the hiring of new or additional personnel for many family-run, small firms who could ill afford that option but who also found it physically hard, if not impossible, to face the proposed schedule without such help. The compromise solution which essentially allowed both systems to coexist was a "prudent" measure which attests to the continuing political power of the sectors threatened by reform tenaciously to hold onto traditional arrangements of market and labor force organization that are profoundly endangered by emerging trends in Greek society and economy.

48. For a brief discussion of the trends towards franchising and subcontracting, see the references contained in note 46 above, especially, Ta Nea [The News], 22 December 1992, 24.

49. Approximately one third of the Greek labor force is employed in wage-earning activities as compared with figures of 70 to 85 percent for the most developed societies in the advanced industrial world. The size of the self-employed sector in Greece is estimated to be approximately equal to that of wage earners.

50. For a an analysis which closely parallels the argument in this study concerning the cross-cutting nature of the underdog and reformist cultures, see Ino Afendoule, "He Hellada anekei ste Dyse;" [Does Greece Belong to the West?], He Kathemerine [The Daily], 23 July 1992, 8.

51. Since 1990, the leaderships of SEB and of GSEE have repeatedly spoken out in public fora in support of reform in the economy, the political system, and the public administration, thereby concretely signaling their desire to maintain a high profile in the current debates concerning the pressing need for restructuring and modernization. See also note 43 above for specific ways in which the two organizations have been promoting a novel and modernizing view of industrial relations in Greece. Indeed, the collaboration between the two seems to be expanding into new areas with significant reformist potential. A good example is the recently announced creation of a jointly-sponsored Labor Foundation whose exclusive purpose will be to carry out research designed to contribute to the containment of unemployment and to the (re)training of labor and trade union cadres. The significance of this initiative lies in at least two areas: first, it signals awareness and concern over the implications of what I have referred to as the "Greek version" of the Death of a Salesman for a significant part of the labor

force; second, it constitutes tangible evidence of the will to explore meaningful ways to cope with the problems generated by this process of change through concrete (retraining, retooling, etc.) and symbolic (moral support) measures. More generally, it underscores the extent to which strategies for the generation of a modern climate of industrial relations are being developed behind the scenes and below the confused and confusing surface of turmoil, confrontation, and conflict. On the establishment of the Labor Foundation, see To Vema [The Tribune], 29 August 1993.

52. For a recent statement concerning convergence as applied to the democratization literature and, more specifically, to the consolidation of democratic regimes, see Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes," in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1-37.

53. For Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis concerning the capacity of ancien regime structures successfully to adapt to the new environment generated by the French Revolution and the transition to modernity which this implied, see his classic work The Old Regime and the French Revolution (New York: Anchor Books, 1955).

54. The sense of frustration, impatience, and irritation generated in many member states of the European Community by the very slow pace of change in Greece and by the problems this implies for efforts to promote the European integration process significantly increased in the course of 1992-93, as Greece's

growing entanglement in the Balkan crisis produced yet another area of divergence between its own policies and those of its partners. The exacerbation of such trends could serve as a basis for the major estrangement envisaged in the third scenario. For typical examples of such reactions, see "Greek Horror Story," Foreign Report, 5 August 1993, 1-2; Wolfgang Koydl, "Gehort Griechenland zu Europa?" Suddeutsche Zeitung, 8 July 1993, 4; and Athanassios Papandropoulos, "Apovole tes Hellados apo ten EOK;" [The Expulsion of Greece from the EC?], Oikonomikos Tachydromos [Financial Courier], 12 August 1993, 5-6 and 87 which contains a plethora of references to published statements in the European press concerning the Greek situation. For a much more sympathetic report which, however, focuses on the central dilemmas examined in this paper, see Brian Beedham, "Last Chance, Sisyphus," The Economist, 22 May 1993, 1-22.

55. It is worth underlining, at this point, the central role which all scenarios for the future evolution of Greek politics assign to the European Community. At one level, this reflects the rather obvious fact that, as a member of the Community, Greece is bound to be influenced by policies emanating from Brussels. At a further level, it also points to the fact that, as already stressed, the Community should be understood as constituting a set of structures that are simultaneously external and internal to the member states and, thus, are able to exert influence upon them in a multiplicity of ways. At the same time, however, the importance assigned to the Community for the eventual success or failure of the reform project in Greece constitutes painful reminder of the historical weakness of the social forces identified with the reformist culture and of the critical role which their strategy for permanent ascendancy in

Greece assigns to the Community link.

56. On the discussion concerning the nature of the 1980s as a "lost decade," see Nicos C. Alivizatos, "Etan mia chamene dekaetia;" [Was it a Lost Decade?], To Vima [The Tribune], 20 May 1990, section A, 12; Panos Loukakos, "He ekdikese mias chamenes dekaetias" [The Revenge of a Lost Decade], He Kathemerine [The Daily], 6 October 1991, 1; Costas Kalligas, "Mia dekaetia chamene gia ten Hellada..." [A Decade Lost for Greece...], He Kathemerine [The Daily], 12 October 1991, 8; and Panos Kasakos, "Chamene Dekaetia 1974-1989" [Lost Decade 1974-1989] in idem, He Hellada anamesa se prosarmoge kai perithoriopoiese [Greece Between Adjustment and Marginalization], 13-28.

57. Of the numerous works which have been written concerning the Spanish transformation of, especially, the last decade and a half, see the important theoretical work by Victor Perez-Diaz, El retorno de la sociedad civil (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Economicos, 1987) as well as the shorter and more recent work by the same author The Emergence of Democratic Spain and the 'Invention' of a Democratic Tradition, working paper 1, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Madrid, June 1990.

58. For an interesting volume attempting to assess the impact of the decade on the political system, see Lyrintzis and Nicolacopoulos, ed., Ekloges kai Kommata ste Dekaetia tou '80 [Elections and Parties in the Decade of the '80s].

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Estudio/Working Paper 1994/50
February 1994

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